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Chapter I: Introduction 
     In the United States over the past century, the relationship between monetary expense and 
political success has grown both increasingly apparent and increasingly troubling. This trend is 
perhaps best manifested in issues surrounding the financing of campaigns for federal office. 
Despite substantial efforts at campaign finance reform in recent years, an easy solution to the 
problem at hand continues to prove elusive. The problem is this: how may the current system be 
reformed so as to produce an optimally-just financing arrangement for U.S. federal election 
campaigns? The considerations involved in answering this question are not merely ones of 
economic efficiency or political pragmatism. We are concerned here with, among other things, a 
problem of justice. Accordingly, in attempting to resolve the problem of U.S. federal campaign 
finance, we must broaden our focus so as to consider the deep ethical implications of the 
problem. 
     In this paper, I will attempt just such a moral-philosophical approach to the issue of campaign 
finance. Specifically, I will apply the work of American philosopher John Rawls to the problem 
of determining the most just financing arrangement for U.S. federal election campaigns. I will 
not attempt a defense or critique of Rawls‟ work; that line of inquiry has been elsewhere pursued 
exhaustively over the past four decades. Instead, I will produce a Rawlsian critique of the current 
state of U.S. federal campaign finance, and from that understanding, I will set forth an initial 
sketch of a Rawlsian program for reform. The critical aspect of this paper will focus most 
heavily on current U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on campaign finance. I have selected this 
target of critique for several reasons, which include constraints of time and space and consider- 
ations of clarity. Most importantly, however, it will become apparent throughout this paper that 
the Supreme Court has played an essential role in shaping the current system of campaign 
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finance reform. Moreover, the Court‟s jurisprudence on this subject is an especially-promising 
mode of critique, as I will be able to directly compare the reasoning employed by the Court in 
several important cases with Rawls‟ own thinking on problems of justice. This focus on the 
Court‟s role will not, however, unduly limit the scope of this paper. I will also provide a general 
overview of the development of U.S. campaign finance, and I will situate the Court‟s decisions 
within the appropriate historical context. 
     The paper will be divided into four main parts. Chapter II will offer the reader a succinct, yet 
comprehensive overview of the relevant aspects of Rawls‟ philosophy. I will necessarily exclude 
discussion of a number of interesting and important parts of Rawls‟ work, instead focusing only 
on the concepts and claims that will bear directly or indirectly on the problem of campaign 
finance. This chapter will, in sum, lay out a general method of critique to be used later in the 
paper. Chapter III will provide a historical overview of the United States‟ evolving system of 
federal campaign finance. I begin early in the nation‟s history, with the rise of modern political 
campaigning, and proceed to the current day. Significant actions of Congress related to campaign 
finance will be detailed, as will the major decisions of the Supreme Court. Chapter IV will then 
consider four of those cases in greater detail: Buckley v. Valeo (1976), Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce (1990), McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), and Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission (2010). In my view, the Court‟s decisions in these four 
cases have most critically shaped the current system of campaign finance. I will then critique the 
Court‟s reasoning in those cases within the framework of Rawls‟ moral philosophy. Based on the 
conclusions reached therein, Chapter V will set forth the conditions necessary for realization of a 
Rawlsian conception of justice in the realm of campaign finance. I will consider the writings of 
several philosophers on the subject at hand and will determine the plausibility of their accounts. I 
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will then lay out my own recommendations for a Rawlsian program of reform. I will conclude 
with a discussion of the practical feasibility of actualizing such a reformative system.  
     Ultimately, I will argue that the current system of U.S. federal campaign finance falls far 
short of realizing a Rawlsian conception of justice. Moreover, I will demonstrate the essential 
incompatibility of the Court‟s reasoning on these matters with a Rawlsian approach to justice. 
Accordingly, drastic reforms to the current system will be necessary if the financing arrangement 
for federal election campaigns is to be considered, in the appropriate Rawlsian sense, just.  
 
Chapter II: Justice as Fairness- an Overview  
     At the heart of any Rawlsian critique of public policy must be a careful reading of Rawls‟ 
moral and political philosophy. For Rawls, the theoretical framework for a just society is not 
merely a mode of analysis or method of criticism in a study of actual society. Instead, the 
implications for his theory of distributive justice are far more practical. The social institutions of 
a just society in the Rawlsian conception are built upon these theoretical principles; without 
them, the society will be prey to economic and politic deprivations of an unwarranted character. 
As such, Rawls‟ philosophy essentially begins with a “focus on the basis structure” [emphasis 
mine] of societies; that is, the major social institutions that allow for all human interaction.1 
Moving upward from this bedrock, Rawls‟ methodology is characterized by a passage of analysis 
from the foundational to the super-structural.    
     In this chapter of the paper, I will follow the same pattern. I will begin by outlining the most 
fundamental philosophical assumptions and claims made by Rawls, including his own 
motivations for beginning the project of A Theory of Justice (1971). From there, I will give an 
overview of Rawls‟ contractarianism and the means by which a society‟s basic structure is 
formed. Next, we will proceed to the core of Rawls‟ philosophy: the notion of „justice as 
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fairness‟ and the corresponding Two Principles of Justice. Given its particular relevance to the 
subject of this paper, I will pay special attention to the First Principle and will offer a careful 
reading thereof. This will require an explanation of the First Principle‟s demand that the fair 
value of the political liberties be guaranteed. With that understanding, I will next discuss the 
four-stage sequence of the formation of a society, which includes the above deliberations of the 
ideal contractors and the positing of the Two Principles. The latter stages of the sequence are, 
respectively, characterized by the construction of a constitution, the writing of particular statutes 
and creation of public policy, and the final adjudication of particular conflicts and application of 
established rules and regulations to everyday social interaction.2 I will then conclude with an 
overview of the proper role of adjudicative bodies, e.g. the United States Supreme Court, and 
their function as the highest embodiment of public reason. This will provide the necessary 
introduction to Rawls‟ view of the Supreme Court in matters of constitutional analysis, including 
the difficult topic of judicial review. This will also lay the groundwork for my subsequent 
discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of campaign finance, which will largely 
constitute the remainder of this paper. 
     As should be clear from the outline just given, my presentation of Rawls‟ philosophy will 
pass upwards along a chain of thought, moving from the core political philosophy of Rawls‟ 
theory to a more focused narrative on adjudicative bodies and constitutionalism. As we progress 
from the foundational to the particular, I will increasingly narrow my focus to highlight the most 
relevant aspects of Rawls‟ thinking. For the time being, however, we will begin at the bedrock 
level. 
A: Motivations and Focus 
     Historically, Rawls‟ theory of justice developed from his own growing sense of dissatis-
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faction with the prior work done in the realm of public morality. In Rawls‟ view, the 
philosophical discipline of ethics had, thus far, failed to apply itself adequately to societies and 
their institutions. Ethics, according to Rawls, had become “increasingly unable to cope with 
morally significant aspects of modern societies”.3 While ethicists had produced excellent work in 
the limited area of the “moral assessment of conduct and character” of individual actors, the 
same amount of careful scrutiny was not given to macro-level collectives of these actors, 
especially those of the modern nation-state.4 It was into this vacuum that Rawls sought to place 
himself with a focus not on the individual, but rather on the collective.  
     In Rawls‟ view, ethics (in his day) had essentially developed into a false dilemma, i.e. a  
choice between unacceptable alternatives. On the one hand, utilitarianism, in its various forms, 
presented the most systematic and rigid ethical theory. However, the conclusions of utilitarian 
calculations were often at odds with our most basic moral intuitions, thus leading to “implausible 
prescriptions”.5 On the other hand, the claims of intuitionism, as the name would imply, 
generally correlate with our all-things-considered moral judgments. Nevertheless, intuitionistic 
ethical theories seemed inadequate in the light of the general desiderata required of a systematic 
moral theory. Thus, Rawls felt “forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism”, 
neither of which would provide a satisfactory account of public morality.6 
     Instead, Rawls develops in his A Theory of Justice a new methodology for tackling these 
problems, albeit a methodology with classical origins. His contractarianism is built upon the 
Enlightenment era thinking of “Locke, Rousseau, and Kant” and is modified to avoid “the more 
obvious objections often thought fatal to [contractarian views]”.7 In other words, Rawls is 
working in the social contract tradition, in which normative considerations are subsequent to and 
derived from the basic ordering of a society. However, as Rawls‟ statement above should 
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indicate, social contract theory had been rendered largely inert via heavy criticism before A 
Theory of Justice. As such, to distinguish between Rawls‟ theory and the work of his 
Enlightenment predecessors, I will follow the usual custom of referring to the former by the term 
contractarianism. While the notion of a social contract is still central to Rawls‟ philosophy, the 
concept has matured considerably since Kant.8      
    The core concept of A Theory of Justice is, obviously, the idea of justice. As Rawls indicates, 
“many different kinds of things are said to be just and unjust”.9 The focus of Rawls‟ work, 
however, is narrower than such a broad definition of justice (e.g. the general description of  
justice as given in Plato‟s Republic). The specific focus here is on the notion of “social justice”, 
which deals primarily with the justness or unjustness of social institutions.10 Of course, the term 
„institution‟ is rather vague and requires further explication. Thomas Pogge gives a definition of 
„social institution‟ as he believes Rawls to mean the term, and I shall rely on this formulation 
throughout this paper. According to Pogge, social institutions are “the practices and rules that 
structure relationships and interactions among agents".11 As stated above, Rawls‟ ethical theory 
operates at a higher level than the usual focus of ethics: the actions of individuals. Thus, Rawls 
focuses on those institutions of a society which enable individuals to interact with one another, 
both in matters of everyday prudential reasoning and in matters of moral significance. Because 
“the social institutions… have a substantial influence on the options available to its members and 
even on the formation of their characters”, Rawls recognizes a lexical priority in analyzing the 
justice of institutions first and the actions of individuals later.12 Thus, Rawls‟ methodology 
emphasizes a study of the “basic structure of a society” as “the primary subject of justice”.13  The 
basic structure of any particular society is the arrangement of its social institutions, including the 
constitution, statutory law, economic structure, adjudicative process, etc.14  
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     Stated simply, Rawls‟ project is an analysis of the means by which a society‟s basic structure 
may be said to be just . Central to this study is the notion of a public conception of justice, or a 
shared principle (or principles) of distributive justice which constrain the formation of the basic 
structure. In later sections, I will discuss the applicable concept of justice in greater detail. 
B: Primary Concerns 
     Rawls begins A Theory of Justice with the statement that “justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions”.15 This is not merely a casual proposition holding that justice is of value to these 
institutions. Rather, this constitutes the claim that justice is of the highest value to social 
institutions, i.e. that these practices and rules are to be judged by their justness or unjustness. 
This, however, raises the question of what exactly is meant by the term „justice.‟ In Rawls‟ 
model, social justice is a three-tiered system. The top tier is achieved through a “contractualist 
thought experiment”, i.e. the original position, by which citizens of a society select a “public 
criterion of justice”.16 The middle tier is the procedure by which citizens, using this criterion of 
justice, create the basic structure of the society (as discussed above).17 The bottom tier is the 
everyday activity of the citizens in following the “rules and practices” of the basic structure they 
instituted.18 As such, the development of a particular conception of justice is left up to the 
citizenry. Nevertheless, these individuals are guided in this activity by universal qualities of 
human behavior that Rawls takes as assumptions. A variety of possible conceptions of justice are 
available to the citizens; however, the range of possibility here is constrained by aspects of 
human nature that Rawls believes to be fundamental and universal. The end result of the process 
of selection (which I will describe in the next section) should be what Rawls terms justice as 
fairness.  
     Before describing Rawls‟ own favored conception of distributive justice, I will briefly explain 
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the primary concerns that, in Rawls‟ view, should be addressed by any adequate conception of 
distributive justice. I must first note that, despite the somewhat misleading title A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls‟ aim in the articulation of justice as fairness is not the presentation of a general 
theory of human justice, much less a theory of right conduct. Instead, the focus here is narrowly 
confined to distributive justice, or the “allocation of the benefits and burdens” of human social 
cooperation.19 Rawls‟ own theory of distributive justice is primarily concerned with the 
arrangement of a society‟s basic structure that will tend to lead to the most just allocation of 
social primary goods.20 Primary goods, in turn, are the “various social conditions and all-purpose 
means that… enable citizens adequately to develop the two moral powers”.21 I will soon describe 
what Rawls means here by the two moral powers, but for now, I will elaborate further on the 
types of goods that may be considered „primary‟ within the realm of social interaction. Rawls 
states that any listing of social primary goods will depend on “various general facts about human 
needs and abilities”.22 In other words, there is no universal set of primary goods; the list depends 
necessarily on considerations of what is needed for persons to live meaningful political and 
social lives. However, several broad categories of primary goods may be identified as being, to 
some degree, crucial to the lives of persons in (at least) democratic societies.23 These are 1) 
“basic rights and liberties”, 2) “freedom of movement and free choice”, 3) “powers and 
prerogatives of offices”, 4) “income and wealth”, and 5) “the social bases of self-respect”.24 We 
may summarize what has been said so far as follows: Rawls‟ primary project is the development 
of a theory of the arrangement of a society‟s main institutions (its basic structure) which will 
tend to most justly allocate these primary goods to the various groups of the society.  
     These remarks bring to light several more fundamental concerns that underlie Rawls‟ work. 
These include both the basic role of human society and what are, in Rawls‟ view, the proper aims 
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of a theory of justice. As mentioned before, the just allocation of social primary goods is aimed 
primarily at the maximization of the exercise of the two moral powers. These may loosely be 
described as the faculties of rationality and reasonableness.25 The former refers to the “capacity 
to have, to revise, and… to pursue a conception of the good” or, in other words, the ability to 
define for oneself a conception of what makes life valuable and then to work to realize that 
conception.26 No limits (other than the general bounds of human psychology) are placed on what 
this conception may entail; the ends of rationality may be founded upon “religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrines” peculiar to individuals.27 What rationality does entail, 
however, is the ability to make decisions that will tend to advance the goals set by one‟s 
conception of the good. The second moral power, reasonableness, involves the “capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from… the principles of political justice that specify the fair 
terms of social cooperation”.28 These „political principles‟ set forth rules intended to allow 
citizens to simultaneously pursue their own individual conceptions of the good, i.e. to act 
rationally.  In essence, reasonableness is the ability to respect others‟ conceptions of the good or, 
more succinctly, to develop “a sense of justice”.29 Now, it should be obvious that a times, or 
perhaps even frequently, these two moral powers may come into conflict. My efforts to pursue 
my own favored conception of the good may limit your ability to do likewise. How are these 
conflicts to be resolved and the two moral powers reconciled? In Rawls‟ view, answering this 
question is the primary task of justice. 
      According to Rawls, a just basic structure can achieve this very goal. He holds that citizens 
can “live together in harmony despite conflicting ideals of the good” if they “share a moral 
commitment to [their] society‟s basic structure”.30 Because of this, Rawls accept and embraces 
the “fact of reasonable pluralism”, or the claim that a plurality of valid individual conceptions of 
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the good may arise among reasonable people.31 However, if we desire that all of these persons be 
able to act rationally (i.e. to pursue these particular ends), there must exist some force to prevent 
the collapse of society from irreconcilable conflicts. This expresses the need for what Rawls 
terms overlapping consensus. In a state of overlapping consensus, a mutual commitment to a 
shared “political conception of justice” exists and allows for communal acceptance of the basic 
structure that arises from this conception.32 Thus, despite conflicting personal conceptions of the 
good, all persons will nevertheless recognize the justness of the society‟s institutions. 
Overlapping consensus is to some degree an ideal and one which leads further to the Rawlsian 
view of an ideal society. This is the notion of the “well-ordered society”, or the society that is 
“effectively regulated by a public conception of justice”.33 In such an ideal association, 
overlapping consensus is achieved by public acceptance of a shared conception of justice. 
Moreover, the society is „effectively regulated‟ by this conception, i.e. its basic structure 
conforms to and reflects the principles of justice which emerge from the public conception of 
justice. Several features of well-ordered societies should be apparent. First, in such a society, 
“everyone accepts and [everyone] knows that everyone else accepts” the same conception of 
justice.34 This involves the notion of publicity, which I shall discuss shortly. Second, in a well-
ordered society, everyone knows that the society‟s basic structure fulfills (or aims to fulfill) the 
shared conception of justice.35 Finally, such a society leads to the development of a sense of 
justice (i.e. the ability to apply the shared principles of justice in practice).36 For Rawls, this 
depiction of human association is an ideal by which to measure actual societies. In the effort to 
reform or reconstitute social institutions so as to make them more just, one should attempt to 
advance one‟s own society so as to be as close as possible to the ideal. 
     I have thus far delayed in providing a formal definition of „society‟ for Rawls‟ theory. 
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However, the formal statement will now be clearer in the light of my above considerations. 
Society consists of (or should consist of) a “fair system of social cooperation over time from one 
generation to the next”.37 Several concepts are embedded in this somewhat ambiguous 
proclamation. First, the notion of „fairness‟ is of great importance, and will be explored more 
fully in my discussion of Rawls‟ favored conception of distributive justice: justice as fairness. In 
essence, shared acceptance of a single conception of justice is impossible without a generally-
recognized belief that the conception and the resultant basic structure are fundamentally fair. 
Second, the fact that society is a system of „social cooperation‟ should be apparent from my 
earlier discussion of the reconciliation of the two moral powers. If all persons are assumed to 
develop and pursue a plan of life, which in turn may conflict with the life plans of others, it must 
be the primary role of society to reconcile these two forces, i.e. to ensure cooperation. Third, the 
society must persist „over time‟. It is to this final requirement for successful human cooperation 
that I will now turn.  
     The idea that a society must persist from generation to generation expresses Rawls‟ concept 
of stability. As Pogge notes, the criterion of stability is “not merely a prudential but also a moral 
one”.38 The requirement is moral in that the citizens of a society have “a moral interest in 
securing the long-term survival of their values and forms of life”.39 As stated before, the moral 
power of rationality involves the ability not only to develop a conception of the good, but also to 
work to realize it. A person obviously cannot be expected to do so if either 1) her society 
collapses or experiences a drastic shift in institutional structure, or 2) the fear of such 
eventualities inhibits the pursuit of personal ends. It is only in a “peaceful and harmonious 
society” that both moral powers may be fully exercised.40 That the criterion of stability is directly 
embedded in Rawls‟ definition of society should indicate its great importance to his theory. We 
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may thus say that, for Rawls, a just society is one in which the exercise of the two moral powers 
is stably and fairly achieved. Closely related to the notion of stability is that of publicity, 
mentioned above in the description of the well-ordered society. It was stated that such a society 
is founded on  a public criterion of justice that everyone accepts and everyone knows that 
everyone else accepts. This is, in essence, the requirement of publicity. Without the realization of 
publicity, 1) overlapping consensus will not be possible, thus 2) no shared public conception of 
justice will exist, and thus 3) no stable cooperation will exist. It is Rawls‟ hope to provide a 
favored conception of justice that will fulfill the criteria of publicity, stability, and fairness, 
among others.41  
      Before concluding this section, it is necessary to note several other constraints on Rawls‟ 
project. First, Rawls‟ theory of distributive justice focuses exclusively on the justness of the 
basic structures of societies. It is not Rawls‟ aim to discuss the wider spectrum of general social 
justice, which has as its subjects alternative forms of human association (e.g. “families, tribes, 
states, universities, churches”, etc.)42 Second, justice as fairness will operate as a solution to the 
above problems of human cooperation only in conditions of moderate scarcity, as has been the 
case with other contractarian theories. Moderate scarcity is the condition whereby sufficient 
resources will allow the “comfortable survival of all members of a society” if allotted 
appropriately; however, these resources are not “so abundant that each can have all his heart 
might desire”.43 Rawls‟ favored conception will not apply to situations of severe scarcity or, for 
example, triage.  Finally, it is important to note that Rawls is working in the context of ideal 
theory.44 In proposing justice as fairness as the best conception of justice for the realization of all 
conditions discussed in this section, Rawls has assumed that comparisons of competing 
conceptions of justice occur in the theoretical realm (as in the argument from the original 
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position below). While Rawls‟ theory has many practical implications, it is not meant to suggest 
that justice as fairness should be fully realized in all relevant human situations. Rather, justice as 
fairness is an ideal by which social institutions are to be scrutinized and reformed.  
     In this section, I have attempted to define the primary goals of Rawls‟ work and the 
conditions which affect the justness of social institutions. I have further sought to describe the 
constraints on Rawls‟ theory of distributive justice, i.e. to lay out the limits of justice as fairness. 
In the next section, I will set forth the primary means by which Rawls has argued for the favored 
status of justice as fairness as a public criterion of justice. This argument- that from the original 
position- should be viewed in the context of the primary concerns and goals of distributive 
justice that were described above.   
C: The Argument from the Original Position 
     It is impossible to adequately to describe the Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness 
without a discussion of the original position. Thus, I will now turn to this thought experiment. 
This is essentially the Rawlsian equivalent of the state of nature of which the original social 
contract theorists wrote. However, it is important to note that Rawls does not believe that this 
state has ever or will ever actually occur. It is, to use Pogge‟s terminology, a “fiction” or 
“thought experiment” intended to provide the theoretical justification for a society‟s basic 
structure.45 The argument from the original position, then, constitutes Rawls‟ justification for 
favoring justice as fairness over its rival conceptions of justice. The argument consists in the fact 
that the parties to the original position would select justice as fairness as the conception by which 
to order the basic structure of their society. 
     In this sense, the original position and resultant agreement form a decision procedure by 
which a person considering the problems of distributive justice may choose the best conception 
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of justice. We may thus think of the argument from the original position as a matter of 
procedural justice. „Procedural justice‟ refers to the means by which systems that distribute 
outcomes are deemed fair or unfair. Rawls describes three forms of procedural justice in A 
Theory of Justice. The first two are perfect and imperfect procedural justice. In both of these 
cases, there exists “an independent criterion for what is a fair division”.46 Perfect procedural 
justice involves cases where such a standard exists (i.e. where the fair outcome is known prior to 
the process being carried out) and the process of division guarantees this outcome.47 As an 
example of perfect procedural justice, Rawls discusses a case where a certain number of 
individuals wish to equally divide up a cake.48 One person is tasked with cutting up the cake and 
then all other people are allowed to select a piece before her. To ensure that she receives as large 
a slice as possible, she will (if rational) cut the cake into equal pieces. By contrast, in imperfect 
procedural justice, an independent standard for a fair outcome exists, but no procedure exists by 
which to guarantee this outcome.49 Rawls gives the example of a criminal trial, in which the fair 
outcome is known beforehand (i.e. the defendant will be found guilty if and only if she is 
actually guilty). However, there is no certain procedure (that we currently know of) that will 
realize this outcome in every case, i.e. erroneous verdicts will always exist.  
     The final form of procedural justice is pure procedural justice, which “obtains when there is 
no independent criterion for the right result”.50 Instead, the process itself ensures the fairness of 
the result. By virtue of the arrangement of the selection process, any outcome that results 
therefrom will be fair.51 For this form, Rawls provides the example of gambling. Given a “series 
of fair bets”, the end distribution of monetary rewards will be fair regardless of the actual 
distribution of resources.52 Now, in Rawls‟ view, the agreement reached in the original position 
reflects pure procedural justice. Because the thought experiment is intended to show us the best 
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conception of justice, we obviously cannot know the outcome beforehand. However, Rawls 
believes that the original position may be formulated so that any conception of justice selected 
therefrom will be fair. Two insights are apparent from this point: 1) this fact expresses the central 
idea of „justice as fairness‟, as this conception is the favored outcome of a fair process of pure 
procedural justice, and 2) from this, we see how the basic structure creates a „fair system of 
social cooperation‟, as described in the previous section. Rawls thus sets out to define the terms 
of the original position so that the selection-process contained therein will both reflect pure 
procedural justice and guarantee the selection of justice as fairness. If this is successful, Rawls 
may reasonably expect that his favored conception will produce fair terms of cooperation. 
     If the thought experiment of the original position is formulated correctly, certain principles of 
justice should result therefrom. The fruits of the agreement are “the principles  
that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial 
position of equality” [emphasis mine].53 They are the principles of justice that such ideal 
contractors would select given the above stipulations and when posed with the question of 
“defining the fundamental terms of their association”, i.e. the basic structure of their future 
society.54 This is the essential form of the Rawlsian original position, by which the citizens of a 
society select a public criterion of justice. Given a correct description of the original position and 
appropriate theoretical constraints described in the previous section, the criterion of justice 
selected will always take the shape of justice as fairness. Rawls defines this concept as the 
particular conception of justice which will “insure that the fundamental agreements reached in it 
are fair”: hence, „justice as fairness‟. 55 As was stated before, there are many possible 
conceptions of justice. However, Rawls believes that justice as fairness is “more reasonable” 
than the alternatives, or, that it would be selected by these contractors above all others.56 This is 
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simply because, when all relevant factors are considered, justice as fairness will result in the 
society with the most fair arrangement of social institutions and, thus, the most fair distribution 
of social primary goods.  
     Several conditions for the original position were given above but not elaborated upon. These 
include the qualifications that the ideal contractors be „free‟, „rational‟, and „concerned to further 
their own interests‟, and that the original position be „equal‟. To begin, Rawls assumes the 
validity of rational choice theory, which holds that individuals will always attempt to act in a 
way that maximizes their personal allotment of goods.57 This implies the ability of actors to 
perform a cost-benefit analysis in any given situation and determine the most beneficial course of 
action. Accordingly, they must also be concerned solely with the pursuit of their own interests.58 
Of course, we might question why it is the case that the contractors need be rational, i.e. why 
they must be solely concerned with personal maximization of value. In contrast, we could 
suppose that the contractors in such a thought experiment are altruistic, or partly altruistic and 
partly rational. However, it is important to bear in mind that the purpose of this thought 
experiment is to morally justify the basic structure of a society, especially in terms of the 
coercive rules that the contractors would impose on their fellow citizens. The Rawlsian initial 
agreement, then, is an attempt to justify the rules and regulations mandated by the basic of 
structure of a society. The justification is simply that any free and rational persons in a state of 
initial equality (as explained below) would accept such impositions because of their rational 
concern for their own interests.59 This need will become clearer as we consider Rawls‟ „veil of 
ignorance‟.  
     Two concepts remain unexplained from the formulation of the original position given above: 
„free‟ and „equal‟. Regarding the former, Rawls takes it as uncontroversial the contractors must 
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be free with respect to a selection of a criterion of justice, i.e. that arbitrary limitations cannot be 
imposed on their selective powers. The only acceptable limitations are those which would be 
“reasonable to impose on [any] arguments for principles of justice”.  60 In other words, Rawls will 
only limit the scope of the contractor‟s powers in trivial or uncontroversial ways, and this is 
achieved through what Rawls terms the “veil of ignorance”.61 In essence, the contractors in this 
thought experiment do not have access to certain information that would be irrelevant, or even 
damaging, to a proper discussion of justice. Rawls provides three „reasonable‟ limitations of this 
form. First, if the contractors are to decide on the just arrangement of society, including the 
allotment of goods and wealth, then “no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural 
fortune or social circumstances”.62 In other words, the deliberations of the contractors must not 
be influenced by natural abilities or disabilities (e.g. intelligence, strength, courage, etc.) or by  
social standing (e.g. wealth, fame, etc.). Correspondingly, Rawls believes that “it should be 
impossible to tailor principles [of justice] to the circumstances of one‟s own case”.63 Finally, 
personal prejudices, biases, moral inclinations, or ambitions must be exorcised from the 
deliberations of the contractors.64 Rawls believes that, ideally, all of these rational limitations 
should be imposed on the contractors when they select the society‟s fundamental principles of 
justice. However, how are these limitations to be imposed? Realistically, it would seem almost 
impossible to fulfill these criteria. 
     It is important to remember that the original agreement of the contractors is a thought 
experiment, i.e. a theoretical attempt to morally justify society‟s basic structure. As such, the 
Rawlsian initial position is an ideal, rather than realistic, notion. The purpose of the experiment 
is not to advocate for this process actually being carried out, but rather that the results it produces 
hold moral significance for evaluations of the justness of institutions. Accordingly, the three 
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fundamental limitations described above are achieved through the „veil of ignorance.‟ In Rawls‟ 
original position, the ideal contractors are stripped of all information prohibited by these 
limitations. They are left only with information relevant to deliberations on justice, and, of 
course, they remain free, rational, and equal human beings. As Rawls puts it, “one excludes the 
knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their 
prejudices”.65 To see clearly the reason for this, let us consider Rawls‟ example of a wealthy 
individual involved in the initial agreement. Let us say that she is considering the question of 
whether or not the wealthy should be taxed to provide for several welfare measures. Clearly, if 
this individual is rational, she will argue that the principle advocating this procedure is unjust.66 
Similarly, a poor individual would likely argue that this principle is just. Both contractors are 
guided here by desires to tailor the society‟s principles of justice to benefit their particular social  
situations. This is clearly impermissible if a fair conception of justice is desired. So, by the veil 
of ignorance, the contractors will have no knowledge of their personal financial standing or any 
other information that is not relevant to deliberations on justice. It follows from this description 
that the contractors are also „equal‟, the last of the undefined terms from our definition of the 
original position. All parties have an equal ability to “make proposals, submit reasons for their 
acceptance, and so on”.67 Moreover, because of the veil of ignorance, no person can steer the 
deliberations toward an end that will unduly benefit herself. Thus, the contractors are fully equal 
within the original position.  
     Of course, the parties must have access to some information. Rawls states that it is 
uncontroversial to require “first principles [of justice] to be general and universal”.68 As such, the 
parties must have sufficient information to produce a general, universal public conception of 
justice. Accordingly, the veil of ignorance does not exclude knowledge of the general facts of 
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human social science (sociology, psychology, etc.) or economic and political theory.69 Further, 
the parties are by necessity aware of the fact that they are selecting principles of justice which 
shall constrain the basic structure of a human society.70 The parties are thus able to apply the 
general facts of human social science to the problem of defining the fair terms of human 
cooperation. Rawls believes that this knowledge will be sufficient to allow the parties to 
accomplish their appointed task. In later writings, Rawls limits the scope of justice of fairness by 
including in the parties‟ knowledge the fact that they are selecting principles for a constitutional 
democracy.71 Aside from the knowledge available to them, the parties are assumed to be persons 
in the relevant Rawlsian sense. That is, the parties have, to at least a “minimum sufficient 
degree”, the ability to exercise the two moral powers.72 However, they are not cognizant of their 
own conceptions of the good or any other facts of their own particular psychologies. It is 
apparent through these considerations that the parties have access to only general facts about 
humans and human experience. 
     In sum, the thought experiment proceeds as follows. A certain number of free, equal, and 
rational persons are gathered and presented with the task of determining a public criterion of 
justice for a new society. These individuals have no knowledge of their natural abilities, social 
standing, personal prejudices or beliefs, etc. They submit various proposals for different 
principles of justice and implement those upon which they can agree. Because each person is 
ignorant of their own standing and abilities, an individual will be unable to tailor the principles to 
suit her own situation. However, because the parties are rational, they will wish to achieve the 
greatest possible benefit for themselves. Thus, in Rawls‟ view, the outcome of these deliber-
ations will be a conception of justice that produces the fairest possible arrangement of social 
institutions. Hence, the original position will end with a public criterion of justice as fairness, 
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from which the society‟s basic structure will be extrapolated.  
      Earlier, it was said that this thought experiment constitutes an argument for the favored status 
of justice as fairness. In essence, the argument is thus: from the list of possible candidates for 
conceptions of justice, the parties will select justice as fairness. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
provides a tentative list of candidates, which includes justice as fairness, the principle of average 
utility, the classical principle of utility, the principle of restricted utility, perfectionism, egoism, 
etc.73 By means of pairwise comparisons among these candidates, the parties proceed by process 
of elimination until one conception remains.74 The parties judge between two conceptions in the 
context of the general facts they are given and with the desire to rationally promote their own 
interests. Now, it is not necessary here to elaborate on the reasoning by which justice as fairness 
would, in Rawls‟ view, triumph over every other candidate. Such an explanation would be 
merely tangential to the aims of this paper, as I am not attempting to critique or defend Rawls‟ 
theory of distributive justice but rather to apply the theory itself as a model for critique. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the greatest challengers to justice as fairness in this decision 
procedure are the principles of average and restricted utility. It will be sufficient here to say that, 
on Rawls‟ view, the parties will choose justice as fairness over these alternatives. The secondary 
literature on the conflict between these three conceptions of justice in the original position is 
extensive, and so I will not attempt a similar analysis here. Instead, I will move forward with 
further exploration into Rawls‟ favored conception of justice. 
D: The Two Principles of Justice 
     Rawls believes that the formulation of justice chosen by the contractors will take a particular 
form, that is, the „Two Principles of Justice‟. In his view, the necessary outcome of the initial  
agreement, as appropriately described above, is justice as fairness as the society‟s public 
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criterion of justice. Justice as fairness, in turn, is best expressed in the form of the Two 
Principles. Accordingly, a society built upon these principles will hold the most just possible 
arrangement of social institutions, i.e. the most just basic structure. Thus, the Two Principles are 
simply a formal statement of the more abstract notion of justice as fairness.  
     I will begin by presenting the principles as stated by Rawls. They are: 
“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone‟s advantage, and 
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all”.75 
I shall refer to these principles as the „First Principle‟ and „Second Principle‟, respectively. 
Within the Second Principle, (b) is often referred to as the „Fair Equality of Opportunity‟ 
principle and (a) is often referred to as the „Difference Principle‟.76 In later writings on justice as 
fairness, Rawls reformulated the Different Principle to read that social and economic inequalities 
are “to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society”.77 The positions of 
(a) and (b) are often switched in Rawls‟ later work, as Fair Equality of Opportunity is seen to 
have lexical priority of importance over the Difference Principle.78 These alterations will not be 
of great consequence for my work, as we shall be primarily concerned with the First Principle 
throughout the duration of this paper. 
     Given that fact, I focus my explanation of justice as fairness on the First Principle, the 
language of which has direct bearing on the question of campaign finance. As with the 
Difference Principle, Rawls reformulated the language of the First Principle throughout his life.  
Thus, the version of the principle that I shall use is slightly different than that given above. The 
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modified First Principle holds that “each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme 
of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and 
in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their 
fair value”.79 According to Pogge, Rawls never fully distinguishes between „rights‟ and 
„liberties‟ in his work, in fact using the terms interchangeably.80 As such, we may consider the 
distinction (if any exists) irrelevant to the questions at hand.  
     Rawls provides a brief (and non-exclusive) list of the basic liberties entailed by the First 
Principle, i.e. those which would follow clearly from the selection of justice as fairness by the 
contractors. There are four categories of basic liberties: “political liberties… liberty of 
conscience and freedom of association… freedom and integrity of the person… [and] rights 
covered by the rule of law”.81 The first category includes the basic freedoms of political speech, 
press, assembly, and (importantly) the right to vote.82 As should be clear from this list, Rawls 
believes that the notion of justice as fairness entails certain aspects of democracy or 
republicanism. While many basic structures of government may be compatible with justice as 
fairness, the concept requires at least some sense of popular input in governance.83 The second 
category of liberties is primarily aimed at freedom of religion and corresponding belief-systems 
(or systems of thought).84 The third category refers to the freedoms enjoyed by persons against 
“slavery and serfdom and… psychological oppression, physical injury, and abuse”.85 Finally, the 
rule of law ensures “protection from arbitrary arrest and seizure, habeas corpus, the right to a 
speedy trial, due process,” etc.86 While this list is not exhaustive, in Rawls‟ view, it covers the 
most basic and most essential liberties entailed by the First Principle.  
     Note, however, that the modified First Principle requires only „a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic rights and liberties‟ [emphasis mine], not a specific scheme.87 This implies that many 
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possible schemes of liberties are compatible with justice as fairness. How then are we to judge 
among the various schemes and determine which are acceptable? According to Pogge, Rawls 
identifies two fundamental concerns that underlie the First Principle. Should a scheme of 
liberties adequately address these concerns and protect against abuses, that scheme will be 
compatible with justice as fairness. First, in a just society, a citizen “must be able to participate in 
the political life of [her] society and to express [her] opinions freely”.88 The reason for this 
concern should be obvious, given the above description of the original position. Indeed, if the 
basic structure of society is to be decided upon by its citizen in ideal conditions, then these 
citizens must have some significant access to the proper functioning of the basic structure. 
Second, an individual must “be free to choose and to change one‟s values and aims”.89 It was 
said earlier that the contractors of the original position must be free. It follows from this 
condition that these contractors will wish to preserve that liberty of conscience in the society 
post-contract. The concern here is also more philosophical in origin: it is assumed that persons 
must be free to pursue and achieve their own particular “conception[s] of the good”.90 As should 
be clear, the first two categories of liberties given above are easily guaranteed by these two 
fundamental concerns. The third and fourth categories are supportive in nature, i.e. the first two 
categories are not possible without personal integrity and the rule of law.91 In this manner, a 
scheme similar to Rawls‟ list of liberties follows from the basic notion of justice as fairness.  
     Thus I have explained the first two portions of the First Principle, that „ [1] each person has an 
equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, [2] which scheme is 
compatible with the same scheme for all‟. [1] is simply a basic statement of that which was said  
in the last paragraph. [2], on the other hand, is merely a logical extension of [1] and the concept 
of justice as fairness. Clearly, if the notion of justice selected is to be fair, it cannot be reserved 
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for an elite or privileged class. Accordingly, the First Principle requires such a scheme of 
liberties to be implemented for all persons in the society. I will now turn to the final portion of 
the First Principle, that „[3] the equal political liberties… are to be guaranteed their fair value‟. 
This final provision is of great importance for my purposes in this paper. As will be seen, the 
notion of „fair value‟ has direct bearing on the power of citizens to participate in elections.  
     It is important to note here that [3] requires only that the political liberties be guaranteed their 
fair value. What this means is that the basic structure of society must ensure the “worth or 
usefulness” of the right and the ability of citizens to “enjoy or take of advantage” it.92 For the 
other three categories of rights, Rawls does not require that the basic structure actually aid the 
citizenry in making use of the liberties therein. It is only for the first category, that of political 
liberties, that fair value must be guaranteed. However, it is not entirely clear why this is the case. 
Rawls merely provides the justification that it would be impossible for the fair value of all basic 
liberties to be guaranteed. Such a scenario would essentially “rule out inequalities” of the 
socioeconomic variety, and the Difference Principle requires that such inequalities exist when 
they are to the advantage of the worst-off social group.93 Accordingly, the fair value requirement 
must be restricted to only some of the basic liberties in order to preserve the consistency of 
Rawls‟ theory. In Rawls‟ view, the primacy of the political liberties indicates that, if fair value is 
to be required for any subset of liberties, it must  be so for the political.  
     I wish to pause here to consider the conditions under which the fair value provision was 
added to the First Principle subsequent to A  Theory of Justice. Such an explanation may 
facilitate better understanding of the provision and emphasize its great importance. The 
amendment was made in response to a troubling objection raised by Normal Daniels in his 
“Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty”.94 In essence, Daniels argues that the potentially-
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large socioeconomic inequalities licensed by the Difference Principle are incompatible with the 
First Principle‟s requirement of a „a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties‟.95 
This is a result of the fact that the equality of a liberty among persons does not guarantee the 
equal worth of that liberty. Daniels argues that it is a historical fact, admitted by Rawls, that 
inequalities in wealth and power tend to produce inequalities in the worth of liberties.96 For 
example, even where universal suffrage exists, equal access to the voting booth does not 
guarantee equal sway over the results of an election. Members of the most-favored groups of 
society have a greater ability, as a result of the wealth and offices they hold, to “select 
candidates, to influence public opinion, and to influence elected officials”.97 Daniels notes that 
even constitutional provisions may be inadequate to address this discrepancy, as relatively- little 
information about actual election mechanisms is available to the parties (even in the 
constitutional stage of the four-stage sequence, as will be discussed in the next section).98  
     Now, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls does distinguish between liberty and the “worth of 
liberty”.99 However, Daniels finds the distinction here inadequate to solve the problems 
described above. On Daniels‟ reading, Rawls (at this point) holds that the worth of liberty should 
be distributed in accordance with the Difference Principle.100 Clearly, such a scheme would do 
little to decrease the likelihood of massive discrepancies in the usefulness of various political 
liberties (i.e. the value thereof) to representative members of different groups. Ultimately, 
through reasoning too complex to describe here, Daniels determines that the selection of 
principles of 1) equal liberty and 2) the equal worth of liberty, are both equally rational in the 
context of the original position.101 Moreover, without the guarantee of equal worth, the First 
Principle seems only a “hollow abstraction lacking real application”.102 As such, Daniels believes 
that the parties to the original position would reject justice as fairness as it stands, as this 
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conception fails to guarantee the usefulness of the liberties it provides.  
      The response to this forceful objection came in the form of the fair value provision of the 
First Principle. This addendum carries the cost of requiring a far more extensive egalitarianism in 
the political sphere than was originally contemplated in A Theory of Justice. Nevertheless, by 
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls has fully accepted the need for a provision to ward off 
the worries brought to light by Daniels. The importance of this provision for my purposes in this 
paper should be clear from the examples provided by Daniels and described above. Using wholly 
legal means not inconsistent with justice as fairness, the wealthy could, in the absence of a fair 
value provision, wield significant influence over the outcomes of elections. While the right to 
vote is guaranteed by the First Principle in its original formulation, the equality of the value of 
this right is not. Moreover, the general rights of political participation described by Rawls would 
indeed seem „hollow‟ if actual participation  were, in effect, unequal. I shall continue to explore 
the theoretical implications of the fair value provision throughout this paper as I analyze the 
degree to which various U.S. Supreme Court decisions reflect this aspect of justice as fairness. 
     Rawls also considers how a society may ensure this fair value in theory, although he notes 
that he cannot adequately state “how this fair value is best realized” in practice.103 In A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls finds economic inequality to have historically devalued political liberty for certain 
members of societies.104 He states that “disparities in the distribution of property and wealth that 
far exceed what is compatible with political equality” have been allowed in most, or even all, 
constitutional systems.105 Pogge notes that, in later writings, Rawls has emphasized the need for 
“insulating the political sphere from financial interests” in order to ensure the fair value of 
political liberties.106 This has mainly taken the form of an advocacy of campaign finance reform 
and reform of general federal election law . In addition, Rawls thinks it likely that the “public 
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funding of elections… more even access to public media, and certain regulations of freedom of 
speech and press” will be necessary to ensure the fair value of political liberties.107  
    For now, however, it is sufficient to state that Rawls recognizes the critical need for the fair 
value of political liberties, especially regarding voting rights and campaign finance. Given that 
the First Principle holds lexical priority for Rawls over the Second, and given that of all the 
liberties entailed therefrom, only political liberties are guaranteed fair value, the high importance 
of this specific category of rights in the context of justice as fairness should be clear.   
E: The Four-Stage Sequence 
     I have thus far described the original position, the resulting initial agreement, the conception 
of justice as fairness produced by this agreement, and the Two Principles that serve as the 
expression of this conception. However, I have not yet discussed the means by which the Two 
Principles translate into the actual basic structure of a society, i.e. the means by which the 
institutions of society emerge from justice as fairness. It is to this element of Rawls‟ theory that I 
will now turn.  
     From the ideal state of the original position Rawls derives the ideal procedure for the  
formation and operation of society. Once more, this is not intended as a historical account of the 
birth of constitutional democracies. Instead, this process offers the theoretical framework by 
which the practices and rules of existing societies may be justified. As such, we may think of this 
process as an extension of the thought experiment described earlier (i.e. the contractualist 
original position). Rawls terms this process the „four-stage sequence‟, each stage of which I will 
now briefly explain.  The stages are as follows: 
• The Original Position Stage 
• The Constitutional Stage 
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• The Legislative Stage 
• The Adjudicative Stage 
     I have already described (1) at length, and so I will begin this explication at the end of the 
first stage. After the selection of the public criterion of justice (i.e. justice as fairness), the ideal 
contractors become, in essence, delegates to a constitutional convention.108 The delegates select a 
particular political form for their government and then author a constitution. As they have 
already agreed upon the selection of justice as fairness, the Two Principles serve as the 
overriding constraints on the content of this constitution. All constitutiona l provisions and, 
indeed, the basic form of government must correspond with the Two Principles.109 However, it 
would be impossible for the delegates to adequately form a society without some further 
knowledge as to the context in which it will exist. Thus, at stage (2), “the veil of ignorance is 
partially lifted”.110 The delegates now gain general information about their society, including “its 
natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic advance and political culture, and so 
on”.111  
     The object of this stage is the formation of a document which “satisfies the principles of  
justice” and lays the foundation for future legislation.112 Accordingly, the constitution sets forth 
the basic structure of society. In this manner, the basic structure emerges from the concept of 
justice as fairness because all provisions of the constitution must accord with the Two Principles. 
However, a constitution must clearly set forth more than a mere arrangement of institutions. 
Such a document must also provide the basis for the operations of society. Hence, the end result 
of the constitutional stage is both 1) a basic structure that exemplifies justice as fairness, and 2) 
proper groundwork for the subsequent legislative stage. Rawls also addresses a concern about the 
predictive power of the delegates regarding the future justness of their society. Put simply, some 
31 
 
constitutional systems will be more just than others, even among the range compatible with the 
Two Principles.113 How then are the delegates to determine which system will be most just? 
Rawls states that “some schemes have a greater tendency than others to result in unjust laws”.114 
Strict compliance with the Two Principles, i.e. the formation of a constitution most heavily based 
on the language of the principles, will prevent such an inadequate scheme from being 
implemented. While no scheme will be perfect, the delegates, given the information allowed to 
them at this stage, will be able to select an adequate constitutional system. 
     At the conclusion of the constitutional stage, the legislative stage (3) begins. The delegates 
thus become legislators and are tasked with determining the “justice of [proposed] laws and 
policies”.115 The results of this stage (i.e. laws) must now comply both with the Two Principles 
and the constraints imposed by the constitution. Because the individuals are now dealing with 
particular issues rather than broad generalizations (as in (1) and (2)), perfection must not be 
expected. Legislators often must decide on issues with less information than would be ideally 
available.116 However, the scope of just legislative options available to them is refined by several 
limitations. First and most clearly, no law may violate the First Principle by producing  
inequalities in basic liberties.117 Second, the Difference Principle will be of particular use to the 
legislators in their attempt to ensure a fair allocation of resources.118 Indeed, while the Difference 
Principle is of little relevance in the constitutional stage, it holds great weight during the 
legislative stage. Ultimately, each of the Two Principles holds special importance for a particular 
stage of the four-stage sequence. The First Principle is most controlling over the constitutional 
stage, in which the basic liberties and structure of government are outlined. The Second Principle 
(including the Difference Principle) bears most heavily on the legislative stage, when legislators 
must resolve issues of socioeconomic inequality. As a general conclusion, Rawls states that the 
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legislators must work, first and foremost, to avoid the enactment of laws that clearly violate the 
Two Principles.119 Beyond such legislation, a greater range of alternatives is available to them 
than in stages (1) and (2). It is also important to note that the veil of ignorance is, once more, 
partially lifted upon the commencement of stage (3). The legislators now have access to the “full 
range of general economic and social facts”.120 While they still do not have knowledge of their 
particular social standings or financial circumstances, they now hold adequate information for 
the construction of the day-to-day operations of society. 
     While the legislative stage is clearly an ongoing process, its original culmination in a 
workable system of statutory law begins the final stage, that of adjudication. In this stage, 
“judges and administrators” conduct the “application of rules to particular cases”.121 The veil of 
ignorance is now fully lifted, with full information available to all parties. In the subsequent 
section, I will provide a fuller account of Rawls‟ view on the proper role of adjudicative bodies. I 
will conclude this section with several remarks on the purpose of this four-stage sequence. As 
was stated above, Rawls does not intend this sequence to be an accurate historical picture of the 
formation of societies, nor even a plan or model for future cases.122 Instead, the four-stage  
sequence offers a method of analysis by which the justness of a society‟s institutions may be 
judged. For example, in examining a particular society X, we may wish to determine whether or 
not X possesses a just constitution. To answer this question, we merely must ask whether 
“rational delegates subject to the restrictions of the second stage would adopt” the constitution of 
X.123 Similarly, regarding a particular statute xn enacted in X, we would determine the justness of 
this statute by asking whether rational legislators would enact xn given the limitations of the 
legislative stage. By these means, we may ascertain the justness of any particular society.  
     It is of great importance to note that Rawls‟ theory of justice as fairness is not intended to 
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select any particular society (i.e. a basic structure with a full set of laws and policies and officials 
to enforce them) as being the most just of all options.124 Rawls‟ aim in A Theory of Justice is not 
to prescribe one single model of human society as that which should, or must, be adopted. 
Instead, the purpose of his theory is to define “the range of justice” and the forms of society that 
lie within that range.125 In addition, the theory “singles out with greater sharpness the graver 
wrongs” that may arise from an unjust society.126 Thus, while we may not be able to describe the 
ideal Rawlsian society with any degree of confidence, we may clearly state which societies (or 
which constitutions, laws, and policies thereof) fail to apply the Two Principles. The thought 
experiment of the four-stage sequence offers the means by which to make such determinations. 
F: The Role of Adjudication 
     I will now briefly outline Rawls‟ views on the proper role of legal adjudication in society, 
with special attention paid to the role of the United States Supreme Court in this particular 
society. As mentioned before, the application of the practices and rules set forth in stages (2) and 
(3) to the conduct of individual actors and collective bodies is accomplished in the fourth stage. 
This process is carried out by administrators and judges, each category of which holds purview  
over one aspect of this process. Administrators oversee the proper functioning of the institutional 
system set forth in the prior stages, while judges determine questions of law regarding individual 
conduct in relation to the institutional system. In this fourth stage of adjudication, the greatest 
topic of concern is the “following of rules by citizens”.127 If the rules to be followed are just, i.e. 
if they are in compliance with the constitution and the Two Principles, then citizens possess a 
duty to abide by them.128 If this does not occur in any particular case, appropriate measures are 
taken to remedy the wrong from the same set of just laws which led to the violation. It is thus the 
role of judges to ensure the just application of the law to particular breaches of duty. 
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    I do not wish to discuss at length the role of judges in state and lower-federal courts in this 
Rawlsian scheme, as such concerns are not strictly relevant to the topic at hand. Instead, I wish to 
emphasize Rawls‟ thought on the United States Supreme Court and, by extension, high courts in 
democratic systems generally. Central to this discussion is the topic of judicial review, or the 
power of the judiciary to review the actions of the executive or the legislature. If found uncon- 
stitutional, these acts may be invalidated by the court. Rawls indicates that the doctrine of 
judicial review is neither prescribed nor prohibited by justice as fairness, i.e. that it exists within 
the range of options available to delegates in stage (2).129 If the judiciary of a society is 
empowered by judicial review (as is the case in the United States), then it falls to the judiciary to 
determine the justness or unjustness of statutes. In other words, the courts become the arbiters of 
questions regarding the compliance of legislation with the constitution and the Two Principles.  
     Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court holds a place of great importance in the Rawlsian 
system. In Political Liberalism, Rawls claims that “in a constitutional regime with judicial 
review, public reason is the reason of its supreme court”.130 The term „public reason‟ refers to 
the doctrine that citizens must “be able to justify their political decisions to one another using  
publicly available values and standards”.131 This idea is rooted in the four-stage sequence 
described above. In the original position, for example, citizens define the public criterion of 
justice based on mutual agreement and from a position of equality. In the constitutional stage, 
these citizens further define the liberties valued by the society from the framework of the 
criterion of justice. Thus, the values of the society are dependent upon the agreement of the 
parties involved; these values do not precede the social contract. For example, consider a judge 
who makes a ruling in a case based on her personal religious views.132 This ruling would be, in 
the Rawlsian scheme, unjust because the action involved cannot be justified by publicly-held 
35 
 
values (unless, of course, the society in question were built on the values of a particular religion). 
In this case, the judge‟s action would violate the doctrine of public reason.  
     According to Rawls, the U.S. Supreme Court is the highest “exemplar of public reason”.133 
This is a result of an important distinction made by Rawls between “higher law” and “ordinary 
law”.134 The former refers to the constitution and its manifestation of justice as fairness; the latter 
refers to legislation enacted by the people or their representatives. A danger exists in consti- 
tutional systems of the higher law being usurped by the ordinary; that is, of constitutional 
provisions being ignored and contradicted by ordinary law. As was described in the four-stage 
sequence, all actions of the legislative stage must be constrained by its predecessor, the 
constitutional stage. Thus, if ordinary law is allowed precedence over higher law, the resulting 
rules and practices of the society will be unjust. A vanguard, then, is required to safeguard the 
higher law against encroachment. In a system with judicial review, such as that of the United 
States, the Supreme Court fills this role, acting as one of the “institutional devices to protect the 
higher law”.135 As stated above, all political actions must be justified to other citizens relative to 
the set of publicly-held values. In addition, these values are embodied in the Two Principles and  
in the constitution. Thus, for any action to be justified by the doctrine of public reason, it must be 
justified in relation to the constitution or the principles of justice it manifests. Where judicial 
review exists, the Supreme Court is empowered to determine the correlation (or lack thereof) of 
actions of the executive and legislature with the constitution. If these actions contradict the 
constitution, then by the doctrine of public reason, they are unjust. Accordingly, it follows that 
the Supreme Court is the highest arbiter of public reason. According to Rawls, the “political 
values of public reason the Court‟s basis for interpretation” of statutes.136 As a result, if the Court 
does not act in a manner consist with public reason, the Rawlsian must hold that the Court has 
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acted unjustly. Should a Supreme Court justice make a determination in a case for reasons other 
than those justified by publicly-held values, her actions would be unjust.  
     It should be evident from this description that a Rawlsian critique of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in a particular area must focus on the Court‟s embodiment of public reason. At a 
higher level, however, this entails a comparison of the reasoning of Supreme Court justices with 
the concept of justice as fairness. Moreover, such a critique requires an evaluation of this 
reasoning in light of the First Principle‟s requirement that the fair value of an individual‟s 
political liberties be guaranteed by the constitution and, accordingly, protected by the Court. In 
the subsequent chapters of this paper, I will strive to offer just such an analysis. The above 
outline of Rawls‟ moral and political philosophy is intended as a brief summary of those aspects 
of his theory which are of particular relevance to this project. I have necessarily excluded 
discussion of certain important and interesting views advanced by Rawls. In general, however, I 
have attempted to provide both the basic shape of Rawls‟ theory of justice as fairness as well as 
more focused discussions on topics of special importance.   
 
Chapter III: Federal Campaign Finance- Historical Context 
     In this chapter, I will offer a brief overview of historical developments in federal campaign 
finance throughout the past two centuries. This will provide the necessary context for the 
Rawlsian textual critique of relevant U.S. Supreme Court decisions that will constitute the bulk 
of the subsequent chapter. Accordingly, I will focus this historical overview on the interplay 
between statutory law, administrative actions, and judicial decision-making that has come to 
characterize the current state of campaign finance for federal elections in this nation. I will pay 
particular attention to the role of the Supreme Court in bolstering, constraining, or invalidating 
the efforts of Congress to establish a strong “regulatory regime for financing federal elections”.1 
37 
 
I will take as the commencement point of the modern era of campaign finance the enactment by 
Congress of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and the subsequent FECA 
Amendments of 1974. The second section of this paper will discuss these reformative measures 
in detail. I will now outline, in broad strokes, the historical events and circumstances which led 
to the adoption of FECA and its Amendments.  
A: Early Developments 
      The debate over campaign finance is, in Corrado‟s view, essentially a product of the long-
standing conflict in political thought over the reconciliation of “basic notions of political 
equality… with fundamental political liberties, such as the freedoms of speech and political 
association”.2 It should thus be of little surprise that the problem of financing elections may be 
traced back as far as the 1830s. Spurred on by the “rise of Jacksonian democracy”, the 
development of well-organized and well-funded political parties created new concerns for the 
financing of campaigns where none had existed before.3 Indeed, before the tumultuous political 
events of the mid-1820s, political „campaigning‟ in the modern sense of the term did not truly 
occur. The only expenditures required of candidates for offices were, broadly speaking, those 
incurred by printing pamphlets and “„treating‟ constituents to food and drink on election day”.4 
The well-known „spoils system‟, associated with the rise to prominence of Jackson‟s Democratic 
Party, put an end to the simplicity of the early system of campaigning. Under the spoils system, 
those successfully elected to office rewarded fellow party members and political supporters with 
government offices.5 One product of the spoils system was the „assessment system‟, by which 
officials elected or appointed to office with party support were expected to “contribute a 
percentage of their salaries to the party”.6 These funds were then used to finance further election 
efforts. Concerns over the spoils system, the assessment system, and the generally-rapid increase 
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in party power soon resulted in efforts to reform the system, but to little avail. A bill, sponsored 
by Representative John Bell of Tennessee, sought to put an end to assessments but was never 
enacted.7 In 1867, Congress enacted a law that prohibited the solicitation of assessments from 
workers in naval yards; however, because the scope of the law extended no farther than naval 
workers, it had little to no effect on federal election financing.8 Thus, from the 1820s to the 
Reconstruction Era, the assessment system directly funded federal campaigns and was left 
largely unchallenged.  
     The first efficacious reforms to the system appeared during Reconstruction. Indignation over 
the corruption of President Ulysses S. Grant‟s administration led eventually to congressional 
action that “barred government workers not appointed by the president from imposing 
assessments on other government workers”.9 President Rutherford B. Hayes further bolstered 
this rule by prohibiting, via executive order, the involvement of government officials in the 
management of campaigns for federal office.10 This order did not, however, constrain the rights 
of elected or appointed officials to vote or to publicly express their views on election contests. 
These measures were codified in the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883, which effectively put 
an end to the assessment system and strictly “restrained the influence of the spoils system”.11 
This was achieved by the creation of a system of competitive examinations required for the 
holding of non-elected offices. As Corrado notes, one unexpected outcome of this law was the 
increased reliance of political parties on “corporate interests, especially the industrial giants in 
oil, railroads, steel, and finance”.12 With the assessment system essentially dismantled, parties 
began to turn outward to the private sector for the funding of election efforts. This trend would 
continue to the current day, resulting in many of the concerns which underlie modern efforts at 
campaign finance reform. By the end of the nineteenth century, industrial and financial actors 
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had become the “principal source” for the funding of campaigns.13 
     Public recognition of this fact, especially among intellectual circles, resulted in reformative 
efforts throughout the Progressive Era that sought to curb the monetary influence of corporations 
on federal elections.  The 1904 presidential election, which featured a high-profile contest 
between Democrat Alton Parker and incumbent President Theodore Roosevelt, further incited 
public concern over large corporate contributions. Parker alleged that Roosevelt had solicited 
funds from wealthy industrialists on the promise that they would be regularly consulted on 
governmental matters.14 Although Roosevelt denied these allegations, an investigation by the 
New York state legislature provided evidence that the Republic National Committee had 
accepted massive contributions from Wall Street financial institutions (e.g. a $48,000 
contribution from New York Life).15 Upon reelection, Roosevelt began to call for the enactment 
of anti-bribery and anti-corruption legislation, as well as (in 1906) a general prohibition of direct 
corporate contributions to federal campaigns.16 Although Roosevelt did little more than offer 
words on the subject without any proposed legislation, such reformative measures were to some 
degree realized in 1907. The Tillman Act of 1907, introduced by Senator Benjamin Tillman of 
South Carolina, banned monetary contributions from nationally-chartered corporations in federal 
elections.17 State-chartered corporations were exempted from the Act, although donations from 
all corporations were prohibited in the campaigns for election of the President, Vice-President, 
Congressional Representatives, and Senators. The Tillman Act was then strengthened by the 
Publicity Act of 1910 (also known as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act), which required post-
election reporting of monetary contributions and expenditures in House elections.18  The 1911 
Amendments to the Publicity Act greatly expanded the scope of the law. Accordingly, reporting 
of both House and Senate election contributions and expenditures was required, and (for both 
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primaries and general elections) it was made mandatory for party committees to provide pre-
election and post-election reports of their finances.19 In addition, the 1911 Amendments 
established the first limits on campaign expenditures, with caps at $5,000 and $10,000 for House 
and Senates contests, respectively.20 
     The constitutionality of the Publicity Act was challenged in Newberry v. United States (1921), 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated several provisions of the law.21 In this case, the 
Court determined that Congress‟ power to regulate elections “did not extend to party primaries 
and nomination activities”.22 Accordingly, the Court struck down the provision of the Act which 
set limits on federal campaign expenditures.23 The Court modified its interpretation of congress- 
ional authority in United States v. Classic (1941), holding that Congress may regulate a party 
primary where “where the primary is by [state] law made an integral part of the election 
machinery” or where the primary is likely to “determine the ultimate choice of the rep-
resentative”.24 This broadened interpretation of congressional authority in regulating primary 
campaigns would later serve as justification for FECA in 1971 and its 1974 Amendments. The 
Newberry decision, along with the 1922 Teapot Dome scandal, further increased awareness of 
the need to reform federal regulations of elections. This resulted in the 1925 Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act (an updated version of the amended Publicity Act), which conformed with 
Newberry by eliminating provisions regarding primary campaigns.25 The 1925 law increased 
disclosure requirements by mandating quarterly financial reports from all national party 
committees.26 The cap on non-primary campaign spending for Senate elections was increased to 
$25,000, while the House cap of $5,000 remained the same.27  
     The Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) completed the cycle of legislation that began with 
the Tillman Act. The1925 law would remain “the basic legislation governing campaign finance 
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until [FECA in 1971]”.28 However, despite the ambitious restrictions on campaign finance its 
language promised, FCPA did little to solve the problems that originally led to the adoption of 
the Tillman Act. With no “effective regulatory regime”, no clear penalties on failure to report 
under the disclosure provisions, and no real mechanism for enforcement, the FCPA was largely 
ignored by federal election candidates.29 Most candidates filed disclosure reports only 
infrequently and campaign spending limits were generally disregarded and rarely enforced. 
Moreover, loopholes in the FCPA and Tillman were abundant and commonly exploited. Multiple 
party committees were established for single candidates, allowing evasion of spending ceilings 
by filtering contributions through several entities.30 A corporation could contribute money 
indirectly to candidates, in violation of the spirit (though not the language) of Tillman, by 
providing bonuses to employees who donated to the corporation‟s favored candidates. Perhaps 
most telling is the track record of enforcement: in the forty-five year history of the FCPA (1927-
1971), only two persons were ever prosecuted for violation of the statute, both during the first 
year in which the law was in effect.31 
     The New Deal Era also produced several measures aimed at regulating federal campaign 
finance, although these laws met generally with as much as success as the FCPA and Tillman 
Act. The Hatch Act of 1939 prohibited both the collection of assessments from workers on 
“federal public works program payrolls” (e.g. the Works Progress Administration) and any 
substantial political activity by these workers.32 1940 amendments to the Hatch Act further 
limited individual monetary contributions to federal candidates and party committees and 
restricted the amount that these committees could spend annually.33 However, the amended 
Hatch Act was subject to many of the same loopholes that enabled exploitation of the FCPA and 
Tillman Act. Moreover, because the Act only capped contributions to „party‟ committees, no 
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limit was put in place for contributions to „independent‟ political organizing committees, which 
immediately began to appear in great number.34  
     The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 broadened the scope of the Tillman Act to prohibit direct 
contributions and expenditures for federal campaigns from both corporations and now labor 
unions.35 The response to these new restrictions would prove to be of great consequence for the 
future of federal campaign finance in this nation. Labor unions (and later corporations) began to 
form political action committees (PACs) designed to channel contributions from members and 
employees to political candidates. The number of PACs expanded rapidly during the 1950s and 
60s; by 1968, thirty-seven active labor PACs existed and spent a combined $7.1 million on 
federal election campaigns that year.36 During this same period, new technological developments 
drastically changed the campaigning methods employed by federal election candidates. The 
advent of television broadcasting led to a more personal style of campaigning, with the focus not 
on concerted party efforts but on individual candidates.37 Candidates increasingly used radio and 
television to spread personal visions and messages not tied to, or perhaps in conflict with, party 
policy. As such, problems with monetary contributions to individual candidates became more 
and more important, while Congress took little action to address the rise of PACs or still-existing 
exploitations of the FCPA. Senator Russell Long of Louisiana attempted to create a system for 
the public funding of campaigns in 1966; however, while the bill to enact these measures was 
passed by Congress, it was rendered “inoperative” in 1967 when Congress voted to postpone its 
effectuation.38 As such, between 1947 and 1971, almost nothing was done to curb the ever- 
worsening problem of federal campaign finance. Moreover, after the Pendleton Civil Service Act 
of 1883 first led to corporations becoming the primary sources of campaign funding, no measure 
adopted since had truly succeeded in curbing the influence of corporate interests on the outcomes 
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of federal elections.  
     It was in this historical context that Congress debated and enacted the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. I will discuss this landmark statute, along with its 1974, 1976, 
and 1979 amendments, in the following sections. 
B: The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
     The FECA was originally passed by Congress in 1971 and went into effect in 1972 after 
being signed by President Richard M. Nixon. The law replaced the FCPA as the governing 
legislation for federal election campaigns and was intended to “address problems stemming from 
the inadequacies” of the FCPA.39 Moreover, the designers of the FECA hoped to curtail the 
alarming trend of rising campaign costs. In this section, I will explore the architecture of the 
original 1971 law as well as the changes imposed on that structure by its 1974 Amendments.  
     The FECA of 1971 sought to remedy the problems described in the last section by three 
means: 1) restraining “personal contributions”, 2) establishing “specific ceilings for media 
expenditures”, and 3) mandating “full public disclosure of campaign receipts and disburse-
ments”.40 I will discuss each of these goals in turn. First, the act focused its limitations on 
personal contributions to those by the candidates themselves and their family members. For the 
combined amount provided by candidates and family, contributions were limited to a total of 
$50,000, $35,000, and $25,000 for presidential/vice-presidential, Senate, and House election 
campaigns, respectively.41 These caps applied not merely to monetary gifts to one particular 
PAC or party committee, but rather to the aggregate sum that a candidate and his or her family 
could contribute to a campaign in which that individual was a candidate.  
     Second, the FECA of 1971 limited the amount that any federal election campaign could spend 
on media presence, including “radio, television, cable television, newspapers, magazines, and 
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automated telephone systems”.42 The caps on media expenditures applied individually to 
campaigns for primaries, general or special elections, and run-off elections. The limit for these 
expenditures was set at “$50,000 or… $.10 multiplied by the voting-age population of the 
[relevant] jurisdiction”.43 Whichever amount was greater would serve as the limit on media 
spending for that particular election campaign. Further, the law declared that “no more than 60 
percent” of media expenditures for a campaign could be in the form of television and radio 
spending.44 Finally, the FECA of 1971 set firm requirements on public disclosure of 
contributions and expenditures. Candidates and political committees were required to issue 
quarterly reports with every contribution or expenditure greater than or equal to $100 listed, 
along with information on the contributor or recipient.45 In addition, contributions of $5,000 or 
more had to “be reported within forty-eight hours of receipt”.46 The legislation also stated the 
appropriate offices with which these reports were to be filed and required additional reports prior 
to elections. These financial reports were made available to the public upon filing.  
     While the original 1971 legislation was somewhat effective in curbing media spending, it did 
little to reduce the overall rise in campaign expenditures. Total spending increased by approx- 
imately $125 million between the 1968 and 1972 election cycles, with the latter occurring after 
the FECA went into effect.47 The 1972 presidential election saw a marked increase in total 
expenditures, with incumbent Nixon doubling the amount his campaign spent in 1968 and 
Democrat George McGovern quadrupling the expenditures of Hubert Humphrey in 1968.48 
These facts alone led to general concern over the effectiveness of the FECA of 1971. The 
Watergate scandal, which culminated in President Nixon‟s resignation in 1974, further 
heightened these concerns. In the aftermath of Watergate, congressional investigations into the 
Nixon campaign in the 1972 presidential election “revealed a substantial number of large 
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contributions and an alarming number of improprieties”.49 Perhaps most alarmingly, 
investigators found evidence of secret slush funds filled with campaign contributions, with these 
monies being used (in part) to fund the Watergate break-in. In response to the public outcry over 
these revelations, Congress passed the FECA Amendments of 1974, which were designed to 
prevent further abuses of this kind.  
     The reforms produced by the 1974 Amendments completely overhauled the 1971 system. 
Most importantly, the Amendments established the Federal Election Commission (FEC), an 
agency tasked with “administering election laws and implementing [a new] public financ ing 
system”.50 The FEC consists of six members (originally, with two each appointed by the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the President) who are 
responsible for collecting finance reports, investigating alleged breaches of election law, and 
enforcing these laws. The FEC serves as the primary agency for oversight in federal election 
campaigns and was intended to be the main means for enforcement of the other provisions of the 
1974 Amendments. I will now briefly discuss the various comprehensive reforms instituted by 
these Amendments.  
     First, the Amendments left intact the 1971 provisions limiting contributions by candidates and 
their immediate family members. However, the 1974 legislation added further restrictions on 
contributions by individuals in general. The limits for individual contributions were set to 1) 
$1,000 to any single candidate for any primary, run-off, or general election, and 2) $25,000 for 
total contributions by an individual to all federal election candidates.51 Political committees were 
limited to $5,000 in contributions to any candidate for a particular election.52 Further limits on 
independent expenditures made on behalf of a candidate for federal office were also put in place. 
In addition, the 1974 Amendments replaced the 1971 law‟s constraints on media spending with 
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general limits on total campaign spending. The following table depicts the aggregate spending 
constraints imposed in 1974, as well as the limits set for expenditures by national party 
committees made on behalf of their favored candidates in general elections: 
 Primary Election(s) General Election 
Senate Candidate 
$100,000 or 
$0.08 x Voting Population 
$150,000 or 
$0.12 x Voting Population 
House of Reps. Candidate 
(multi-district state) 
$70,000 $70,000 
House of Reps. Candidate 
(single-district state) 
$100,000 or 
$0.08 x Voting Population 
$150,000 or 
$0.12 x Voting Population 
Presidential Candidate 
$10,000,000 
(for nomination campaign) 
$20,000,000 




$0.02 x Voting Population 
National Party Committee- 
House Campaign 
N/A $10,000 
National Party Committee- 
Presidential Campaign 
N/A $0.02 x Voting Population 
Source: Corrado, p. 23 
     These figures were all “indexed to reflect increases in the Consumer Price Index [CPI]”.53 
Moreover, candidates could spend an additional amount, equal to 20 percent of the cap for each 
election, on fundraising.54 These spending ceilings, combined with the above limits on individual 
contributions, were intended to force candidate to fund campaigns through contributions by 
small donors. Further limits were put in place for expenditures on nominating conventions by 
both major and minor parties. The disclosure requirements of the 1971 law were also bolstered 
by the 1974 Amendments. Most importantly, candidates were required to “establish one central 
campaign committee through which all contributions and expenditures had to be reported”.55 In 
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election years, finance reports had to be filed with the FEC each quarter, ten days prior to an 
election, and thirty days after the election. In non-election years, finance reports were due at the 
end of the year.  
     Thus, the 1974 Amendments greatly strengthened all three areas of focus in the FECA of 
1971: personal contributions, campaign spending, and public disclosure. The 1974 legislation 
also achieved the landmark goal of establishing a system of public funding for presidential 
campaigns. In general elections, major party candidates were entitled to receive $20 million in 
funds if “they agreed to refrain from raising any additional private money”.56 As should be clear, 
this amount was equal to the ceiling on general election spending in the above table. Minor party 
candidates were allowed access to a sum proportionate to the number of votes they received in 
the last election. For primary elections, presidential candidates could receive up to half of the 
spending cap for primaries ($10 million) if they met certain criteria.57 Public funding was also 
available for national party conventions at a rate of $2 million per major party.58 This system was 
administered by the FEC and funded by a “voluntary tax check-off established… by the Revenue 
Act of 1971”.59 Monies collected from this check-off were placed in the Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund, with the FECA Amendments of 1974 modifying the Revenue Act to meet the 
above parameters.  The system was set to go into effect in time for the 1976 presidential election. 
     The establishment of the FEC, the strengthening of relevant provisions of the 1971 law, and 
the institution of public financing all were promising efforts toward solving the problems of 
federal campaign finance. This legislation unquestionably represented the most comprehensive 
reform of campaign finance yet enacted. However, by the time of the 1976 election cycle, 
substantial changes in the FECA had been forced by the United States Supreme Court‟s decision 
in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). Several of the more radical provisions of the 1974 Amendments did 
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not survive the Court‟s judgment. It is to this case that I will now turn. 
C: Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and the FECA Amendments of 1976, 1979  
     I will now explore the Supreme Court‟s controversial decision in Buckley v. Valeo, a 
landmark case that dealt specifically with the FECA of 1971 and its 1974 Amendments. As with 
the three other Supreme Court cases I will discuss in this paper, I will not offer her a critique of 
the Court‟s reasoning or rule in Buckley. The Rawlsian textual critique of these four cases will 
constitute the bulk of the next chapter of this paper. For now, I will offer only a brief summary of 
the background facts, ruling, and impact of each case. I will begin with Buckley.  
     On January 2, 1975, a “coalition of both conservatives and liberals filed suit” against Francis 
R. Valeo, Secretary of the United States Senate, as a representative of the federal government.60 
The coalition, which included Senator James Buckley, former Senator Eugene McCarthy, activist 
Stewart Mott, the ACLU, the American Conservative Union, etc., challenged the constitute-
ionality of the amended FECA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.61 The 
District Court upheld the act; further, on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia found only one provision of the law unconstitutional.62 Upon appeal, the Supreme 
Court issued a writ of certiorari and heard oral arguments for Buckley et al. v. Valeo on 
November 10, 1975. The appellants alleged that various provisions of the FECA violated the 
First Amendment‟s speech and association clauses and the Fifth Amendment‟s  equal protection 
clause.63 The provisions under attack included: 1) limits on individual and group contributions to 
single candidates, 2) limits on total contributions to federal election candidates by individuals, 3) 
expenditure ceilings for campaigns by candidates, PACs, and party committees, 4) public 
disclosure requirements, 5) the system of public financing of presidential elections, and 6) the 
appointment methods for FEC members .64 In general, the appellants claimed that monetary 
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contributions constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.65 Prior to 1976, the Court 
had not addressed the question of whether campaign donations were to be construed as protected 
speech.  
     The Court delivered its decision on January 30, 1976, in time for its judgment to apply to the 
presidential election of that year.66 Offered per curiam, the opinion of the Court did not claim 
authorship by any particular justice; indeed, only Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Powell joined in 
the opinion in its entirety.67 The other justices and Chief Justice Burger (with the exception of 
Justice Stevens, who took no part in the decision) wrote opinions that joined in part and 
dissented in part with the Court‟s opinion. The Court‟s decision upheld the relevant provisions of 
the FECA for (1), (2), (4), and (5) above, but struck down (3) and (6). That is, the Court 
determined that the FECA‟s caps on independent expenditures, candidate expenditures, and party 
or PAC expenditures violated the First Amendment‟s protection of free expression.68 Moreover, 
the Court concluded that the need for “preventing the actuality or appearance of corruption” did 
not constitute a sufficiently-strong governmental interest to license the curtailing of political 
speech through spending caps.69 In the case of contribution limits, however, the Court found that 
the need to prevent corruption did constitute a compelling governmental interest. However, the 
Court concluded that candidates themselves may spend unlimited amounts of their own money 
on their campaigns. In addition, the Court struck down the means of appointment for FEC 
members under the 1974 Amendments as a violation of the Constitution‟s appointment clauses 
under Article II, Sec. 2, Clause 2.70 Essentially, the Court found that the joint appointment of 
FEC members by the President pro tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the 
President ran contrary to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Because FEC members wield 




     The Buckley decision is notable for many reasons. First and foremost, the Court determined 
that campaigns contributions do constitute speech, which may only be limited in the presence of 
a compelling governmental interest (see: United States v. Carolene Products (1938), footnote 4). 
In addition, the Court upheld both the contribution caps and the system of public financing set 
forth in the 1974 FECA Amendments. The Court‟s distinction between contribution and 
expenditure ceilings, with the former being constitutional and the latter not, set a jurisprudential 
precedent that is both finely-drawn and controversial. Perhaps most importantly, however, the 
Buckley decision necessitated hasty congressional action in revising the FECA in time for the 
1976 election cycle. This resulted in the 1976 FECA Amendments, which I will now briefly 
discuss. First, to comply with the Court‟s ruling on FEC appointments, the Amendments require 
that FEC members be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.71 Stripped of its 
power to appoint FEC members, Congress granted itself veto power over all rules and 
regulations produced by the FEC. Second, Congress raised the “limit on individual contributions 
from $1,000 to $5,000”.72 Third, the Amendments restricted solicitation efforts by PACs and set 
forth stricter reporting requirements for these groups.73 Fourth, the law set limits at 1) $15,000 in 
contributions from PACs to national parties, and 2) $17,5000 from national parties to Senate 
candidates.74 In sum, the architects of the 1976 Amendments sought to compensate for the 
serious losses to the 1974 Amendments that occurred subsequent to Buckley.  
     A final set of amendments was passed by Congress in 1979 in response to criticisms of the 
FECA after the 1976 election. Disclosure requirements were generally lessened in response to 
claims from candidates that the existing requirements were too “burdensome”.75 Other provisions 
revised the scope of FEC enforcement power and adjusted the amounts candidates could receive 
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from public funding. Perhaps most notably, the 1979 Amendments allowed „hard‟ money (i.e. 
donations made for advocacy of specific candidates) to be used to “fund narrowly defined 
activities without having the expenditures count against the limits on” party contributions to 
candidates.76 This allowed state and local party committees to exercise greater influence over 
federal election campaigns. Corrado notes that, contrary to common belief, the 1979 
Amendments did not create the distinction between „hard‟ and „soft‟ money, nor did the statute 
directly cause the sharp rise in soft money usage throughout the 1980s and 1990s.77 However, 
the 1979 Amendments did create a large amount of flexibility in national party compliance with 
campaign finance law.  
     These and other measures contributed to the prominence of soft money (i.e. independent 
expenditures used for party purposes other than specific candidate advocacy) in subsequent 
decades. Soft money was used to indirectly finance election campaigns by means of get-out-the-
vote efforts, grassroots organizing, etc. Moreover, the increasing prominence of PACs, which 
intensified following the „sanctioning‟ of PACs by the FECA, presented another disturbing 
trend.78 Two factors contributed to this trend in the 1980s and 1990s: 1) the amended FECA set 
higher caps on contributions for PACs than individuals, thus incentivizing the formation of 
PACs, and 2) the FEC allowed (and often encouraged) the formation of PACs by corporations 
and labor unions.79 This latter factor allowed wealthy corporations to fund campaigns easily and 
efficiently by simply forming a PAC that represented corporate interests. Accordingly, while the 
FECA of 1971 and its Amendments made significant efforts toward curtailing abuse in campaign 
finance, the legislation failed to prevent many exploitations of the system that arose soon after 
1979. By 2000, total party acceptance of soft money had risen to $495 million annually; at the 
same time, PACs were able to circumvent much of the „spirit‟ of campaign finance law.80 During 
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these decades, the FEC‟s continued refusal to address these problems only worsened the state of 
campaign spending in the United States. Few significant efforts were made by Congress prior to 
2002; minor revisions to the FECA were occasionally passed, but major reforms were not 
enacted. The only significant reform of campaign finance law in this period came in the form of 
an amendment to the tax code in 2000, which closed a loophole that allowed tax-exempt 
„political organizations‟ under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code to avoid FEC 
regulations.81 Otherwise , neither Congress nor the FEC took any substantial action to address 
the problems left untouched by the FECA.  
D: Supreme Court Decisions prior to 2002 
     In the period between Buckley in 1976 and the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002, the Supreme Court significantly addressed the question of campaign finance in 
three cases. I will briefly describe the material facts, reasoning, and judgment for each case. 
     Two years after Buckley, the Court decided the case First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
(1978). This case involved a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited “a corporation from 
spending money to influence referendums on questions that did not materially affect the 
property, business, or assets of the corporation”.82 The appellant, the First National Bank of 
Boston, sought to fund an advertisement opposing a proposed state income tax to be decided by 
referendum. It was uncontroversial that, under Massachusetts law, taxation of individuals was 
considered to not affect corporations‟ material interests.83 However, on appeal to the Supreme 
Court after the criminal statute was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the 
former found the statute in question unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the worth of 
speech (and thus its status of protection under the First Amendment) depends not on the source 
of the speech, but the speech itself.84 Accordingly, the statutory distinction between corporations 
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and individuals in this context was found to be unconstitutional. Furthermore, the advertisement 
in question would not have gone to further a particular candidate‟s campaign, and thus no “quid 
pro quo” could be sought by the corporation (as perhaps would be sought through donations to a 
candidate for office).85 As such, there did not exist any compelling governmental interest to 
license the abridgment of corporate speech, as no actual or apparent corruption could exist. 
Accordingly, the Court invalidated the Massachusetts criminal statute in question. 
     Of course, the above case concerned a ballot referendum rather than a political campaign. The 
precedent established by the Bellotti case is thus narrowly tailored to the context. In 1986, 
however, the Court did take up the question of corporate expenditures for political campaigns in 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission. This case concerned a pro-
life group called the Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), which paid for and distributed 
print media endorsing  particular candidates for office.86 The FEC determined that this act 
violated the FECA‟s prohibition on direct corporate expenditures in federal elections. The Court 
disagreed, finding that the FEC‟s ruling overly-burdened the corporation‟s speech by restricting 
the form of the speech, rather than the speech itself.87 Because corporations could still pay for the 
administration of PACs to achieve the same ends (i.e. influence in the public forum), the FEC 
had prohibited only the corporate form of speech. In the Court‟s view, this unfairly burdened 
corporations by imposing additional constraints on corporate speech that were not present for 
individuals. As such, the FEC‟s interpretation of the relevant FECA provision violated the First 
Amendment. At first, this opinion may seem to run contrary to the Court‟s decision in Buckley, 
in which the Court upheld the prohibition on direct contributions from corporations to 
campaigns. However, Ortiz notes that much of the Court‟s opinion in this case is dictum, as the 
issue at hand involved only expenditures by „ideological‟ corporations like the MCFL.88 Despite 
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the rhetoric of the opinion, the Court‟s judgment was not binding for regulations concerning 
traditional „economic‟ corporations, i.e. businesses. This issue would not be resolved until Austin 
v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990). 
     In the Austin case, the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce sought injunction against a 
provision of Michigan state campaign finance law. The Michigan law essentially mirrored the 
FECA (as amended in 1979) by prohibiting “corporations from making independent 
expenditures” for political campaigns but allowing corporations to create “separate segregated 
funds” not directly filled by the corporate.89 The Chamber of Commerce claimed in this case 
that, in extension of Bellotti to campaigns in addition to referendums, corporate campaign 
expenditures constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.90 After determining that 
the Chamber of Commerce constituted an „economic‟ corporation, the Court took up the question 
of whether speech by such institutions could be regulated. As with all attempted governmental 
regulation of speech, the Court considered whether a compelling governmental interest existed to 
license the limitation of „economic‟ corporate speech. In this case, the Court did find such a 
compelling interest to exist: namely, the prevention of undue influence over public opinion by 
“„immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth”.91  
     The Court‟s primary concern in this case was rooted in the danger that corporations, which 
may or not hold general public support, could sway the results of campaigns contrary to general 
public opinion. In general, the Court concluded that the corporate form itself (though only for 
economic corporations) poses the threat of apparent or actual corruption if corporations are 
allowed to directly finance political campaigns. It is not, as Justice Marshall‟s opinion makes 
clear, the mere aggregation of capital that produces a compelling governmental interest in the 
limitation of corporate speech. Instead, economic corporations by virtue of their state-charted 
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structures are subject to limited political speech. As Justice Scalia notes powerfully in his 
dissenting opinion for this case, the rationale employed here by the Court contradicts the 
reasoning that underlies the Buckley opinion.92 I will explore this inconsistency more fully in the 
next chapter, in which I will analyze the reasoning behind both cases. Further discussion of the 
contradiction here will prove fruitful in my attempt to determine the degree to which various 
Court opinions have complied with the Rawlsian framework for questions of justice.  
E: The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and McConnell v. FEC (2003) 
       On March 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (BCRA), often called the McCain-Feingold Act after its primary sponsors, Senators 
John McCain and Russ Feingold. The law was enacted by Congress with the explicit goals of 
reducing the influence of soft money on federal election campaigns and resolving outstanding 
problems with “issue advocacy advertising”.93 The latter concern refers to the distribution of 
media intended to stir public awareness about a particular issue or policy, often in relation to 
specific candidates for office. „Pure‟ issue advocacy media does not declare that viewers or 
listeners should take any specific stance on the relevant issue or vote in any particular war. 
However, the distinction between pure and impure issue advocacy, i.e. that which suggests a 
certain stance that should be adopted, is often difficult to judge. Along with the regulation of soft 
money and several other prevailing concerns with federal campaign finance, the BCRA sought to 
address problems with issue advocacy advertising. 
     First and foremost, the BCRA banned the collection or use of soft money at the federal level 
by prohibiting national party committees from “soliciting, receiving, spending, transferring or 
directing… any funds that are not subject to” federal election law, i.e. soft money.94 Thus, parties 
could no longer collect or distribute funds not bound by contribution limits, spending caps, 
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reporting requirements, etc. Candidates and federal office-holders were also prohibited from 
collecting or distributing soft money. To close off any potential loopholes, the BCRA further 
prohibits national, state, and local parties “and their agents… from soliciting funds for or 
otherwise financially supporting tax-exempt organizations”.95 This provision was intended to 
preclude the use of soft money for funding organizations like get-out-the-vote initiatives or IRC 
sec. 527 organizations. For the past two decades, tax-exempt organizations of this sort had been 
used by national parties to indirectly support specific candidates in the absence of FECA 
regulation. The BCRA now made this party strategy difficult to realize.96  
     The legislation also prohibited the use of soft money by state or local party committees in the 
financing of media that “promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a candidate”.97 This provision 
was intended to close the “issue advocacy loophole” in the FECA, by which state and local party 
committees could distribute advocacy media not subject to federal regulation.98  The BCRA 
particularly targets „express‟ advocacy advertising, or that which is intended to support or oppose 
particular candidates. The legislation defines express advocacy in terms of “electioneering 
communications” and prevents labor unions and corporations from funding such media.99  
Individuals who financed such media were required to disclose expenditures and report 
contributions over certain amounts. Moreover, all express advocacy not funded from these 
courses that featured federal candidates had to be financed through hard money. Under additional 
provisions, voter turnout, registration, and identification drives were regulated under the BCRA 
and, when a federal candidate was on the ballot, no soft money could be used in their 
financing.100  
     As should be clearly, the BCRA virtually eliminated the significant use of soft money in 
federal election campaigns. To compensate for the sudden loss in funding for federal election 
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campaigns, the BCRA also raised contribution limits for both PACs and individuals. The law 
nearly doubled the total amount individuals may give to candidates, party committees, and PACs 
per election cycle, as well as increasing the amounts that individuals may contribute to specific 
candidates, national parties, and state parties.101 The following table depicts a sample of the 
difference in several forms of allowable individual contributions between 1979 and 2002: 
 Permissible Individual 
Contributions: 
FECA (1979) BCRA (2002) 
Aggregate per  
Election Cycle 
$50,000 $95,000 
National Party Committee $20,000 $25,000 
State Party Committee $5,000 $10,000 
Federal Candidate $1,000 $2,000 
Source: Corrado, p. 41 
The legislation did not, however, alter the permissible amounts for individual contributions to 
PACs or for PAC contributions to party committees.102 Further, except for contributions to state 
party committees, these caps are indexed relative to the Consumer Price Index and have 
increased over time.  
     The BCRA represented a significant effort toward addressing the problems in federal 
campaign finance that had arisen since 1979, especially with the increase in soft money usage. 
However, it did little to address the growing influence of PACs and, much as the FECA and its 
Amendments had previously, seemed to even tacitly endorse this trend. Nevertheless, the 
legislation was far from uncontroversial. Almost immediately upon adoption of the law, eleven 
separate suits were filed against the BCRA in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.103 Moreover, the law contained a provision calling for expedited judicial review, 
given that it was widely expected to be challenged constitutionally prior to its passage. 
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Accordingly, the District Court merged the eleven complaints into one  legal action, McConnell 
v. Federal Election Commission, which was quickly tried before a special three-judge panel.104 
Upon the conclusion of argument, the panel found some parts of the law unconstitutional and 
upheld others. The expedited judicial provision also called for automatic appeal to the Supreme 
Court upon conclusion of this trial, and so the Court heard oral argument for McConnell by 
September 2003. The Court issued its opinion on December 10, 2003 and, to the surprise of 
many, “upheld all of the major provisions of the law”.105  
     Appellants challenged the constitutionality the of almost all major provisions of the BCRA, 
claiming that these provisions violated the First Amendment‟s speech and assembly clauses. 
Justices Steven and O‟Connor delivered the opinion of the Court regarding Titles I and II of the 
BCRA, which regulate the use of soft money and the financing of issue advocacy media, 
respectively.106 The Court upheld all challenged parts of Title I except for a minor provision 
“that would have required party committees to decide whether to make independent or 
coordinated expenditures in support of a candidate”.107 All other provisions were found neither to 
violate the speech nor assembly clauses of the First Amendment; further, the Court determined 
that Congress held appropriate authority under Article I to enact said provisions. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist authored the opinion of the Court for Titles III and IV of the BCRA, determining for 
most challenges thereto that appellants lacked standing.108 The Court did, however, strike down a 
provision prohibiting political contributions by minors (i.e. individuals aged seventeen years or 
younger) as a violation of these minors‟ First Amendment rights. Justice Breyer authored the 
Court‟s opinion in regard to Title V, holding that no facial violation of the First Amendment 
occurred in any challenged provision.109 Accordingly, the Court upheld all but two relatively-
minor provisions of the BCRA. However, various parts of the Court‟s judgment were reached by 
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“the narrow margin of 5-4”.110 
     Perhaps the most contentious aspect of McConnell was the question of constitutionality 
regarding issue advocacy advertisement. While the District Court panel had invalidated several 
provisions of the BCRA regarding this issue, the Supreme Court upheld virtually every portion 
of the law dealing with this subject.111 A central component of the argument provided by 
appellants was that the BCRA failed to distinguish between „issue‟ and „express‟ advocacy.112 
According to McConnell et al., individuals hold an “„inviolable First Amendment right to engage 
in [that] category of speech”.113 Appellants distinguished issue and express advocacy by defining 
the latter as containing „magic words‟, a term taken from the Buckley decision. These magic 
words, e.g. „vote for‟, „support‟, „elect‟, allegedly constitute the speech‟s tendency to support or 
oppose candidates.114 The Court, however, disagreed with this analysis. Instead, the Court found 
that the First Amendment does not erect “a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called 
issue advocacy”.115 In the Court‟s judgment, an advertisement may be clearly intended to support 
or oppose specific candidates, and may thus be regulated under law, even in the absence of 
magic words. Accordingly, the Court rejected appellants‟ argument that the BCRA violated the 
First Amendment by limiting „inviolable‟ speech rights.  
     McConnell would cement the BCRA as the primary governing legislation for federal 
campaign finance until the current day. However, despite the Court‟s initial upholding of all 
major provisions of the law, the BCRA would face a serious challenge to its constitutionality 
seven years after McConnell. It is to the discussion of this case that I will turn next and with 
which I will conclude this chapter of the paper.  
F: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 
     The Court‟s landmark decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 
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both invalidated several key provisions of the BCRA and overturned prior Court precedent. I will 
now discuss the material facts of the case and briefly describe the Court‟s reasoning and 
judgment. In the next chapter of this paper, I will explore the reasoning underlying the Court‟s 
opinion, as well as the case‟s various concurring and dissenting opinions, in detail.    
     In the middle of the primary season for the 2008 presidential election, a non-profit 
corporation called Citizens United produced a film entitled Hillary: The Movie.116 The film was 
clearly critical of then-Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, at that time a candidate for the 
Democratic Party nomination. In January 2008, Citizens United produced television advertise- 
ments to promote the film, which was set to soon air on cable television via video-on-demand.117 
Citizens United, concerned that the advertisements for this film would violate the BCRA‟s 
prohibition against electioneering communication within thirty days of a primary, sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief.118 The corporation claimed that the provisions of the BCRA 
which 1) prohibited corporate funding of campaign expenditures (§ 441b), and 2) required 
disclaimers and disclosure reports for media communication (§ 201 and § 311), were 
unconstitutional. The District Court for the District of Columbia denied the corporation this relief 
and granted the FEC summary judgment.119 Citizens United then appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which granted certiorari and heard oral argument in March 2009. The case was reargued in 
September 2009 after the Court instructed the parties to prepare briefs concerning whether or not 
Austin and relevant portions of McConnell should be overturned.120 On January 21, 2010, the 
Court delivered its opinion, invalidating the long-standing federal ban on corporate independent 
campaign expenditures but upholding the relevant disclaimer and disclosure provisions of the 
BCRA.121  
     The Court first determined that Hillary and its advertisements did constitute „electioneering 
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communication‟ and that these videos were clearly forms of express advocacy media.122 Further, 
because part of the funding for the film came from for-profit institutions, the Court found that 
Hillary did not meet the exception set forth in the Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. case, even 
though Citizens United itself was a non-profit corporation.123 As such, the Court dismissed the 
corporation‟s as-applied challenges to the regulation of Hillary by the FEC. Clearly, the film was 
the type of expenditure intended to be regulated under relevant provisions of the BCRA. The 
Court then addressed the facial challenge to the constitutionality of these provisions. The Court 
notes that, pursuant to the Bellotti case, the right to free speech does extend to corporations.124 
However, contrary to Austin, the Court in this case concluded that no compelling governmental 
interest exists to justify the limitation of this speech.125 Essentially adopting the view of Justice 
Scalia from his dissenting opinion in Austin, the Court determined that the positing of this 
interest contradicted the ruling in Buckley and was not sufficiently compelling to curtail political 
speech. However, the Court found no conflict between the disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements of the BCRA and the Buckley decision.126  
     In sum, the Court ruled as follows: 1) § 441b of the BCRA, which prohibits corporate 
campaign contributions, violates the First Amendment; 2) § 201 and § 311 of the BCRA, which 
mandate disclaimers and disclosure reports for political communications, are valid; 3) Austin is 
overturned; and 4) the portion of McConnell which upholds § 441b is overturned. The court‟s 
judgment in this case struck down only one provision of the BCRA, and certainly this law 
remains the governing legislation for campaign finance in U.S. federal elections. However, the 
invalidation of the federal ban on corporate and labor union campaign expenditures has great 
consequences for the future of campaign finance in this nation. Moreover, as Gilpatrick notes, 
Citizens United‟s greatest significance will likely be “not for what it means for corporate 
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campaign spending, but for what it signals for the future of campaign finance reform”.127 I will 
not attempt to speculate here as to what this future will be, nor will I attempt to analyze current 
data regarding campaign expenditures to determine the present impacts of this case. Such 
analyses would go far beyond the scope of this project.  
     Instead, in the subsequent chapter, I will focus on the text of the four most significant 
Supreme Court cases discussed above: Buckley, Austin, McConnell, and Citizens United. I will 
seek to identify the legal reasoning employed by the various opinions of each case and to, if 
possible, pick out strands of thought reflective of a Rawlsian conception of distributive justice. 
Where this is not possible, I will highlight the disparities between the Court‟s reasoning and the 
Rawlsian model for public reason. I will conclude by emphasizing that the above historical 
background has been offered solely to provide context to the textual analysis of the next chapter. 
While this overview has been necessary, it has not been my goal to offer a comprehensive 
account of federal campaign finance reform. Instead, I have merely attempted to situate the focal 
points of this paper‟s textual analysis within a meaningful historical context.  
 
Chapter IV: Textual Critique of Representative Cases  
     In this chapter, I will offer a Rawlsian textual critique of what are, in my view, the four most 
important U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the realm of federal campaign finance. These are: 
Buckley v. Valeo (1976), Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990), McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission (2003), and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
(2010). I will leave the other cases mentioned in the previous chapter to the side, as I believe the 
above four cases adequately represent the relevant undercurrents in Court reasoning since the 
adoption of the FECA. As mentioned before, my aim here is not to study the tangible effects of 
each case, but rather to critique the reasoning employed by various Court justices in the light of 
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Rawls‟ theory of distributive justice. My ambition will be to pick out from each opinion the legal 
rules or principles relied upon therein, and then to determine whether the use of these principles 
accords with justice as fairness or, more broadly, Rawls‟ framework of thought on justice.  
     For each case, I will focus solely on the majority opinion of the Court, leaving to the side 
concurring and dissenting opinions (given the limited space I have here). As I move through each 
opinion, I will play the role of the Rawlsian commentator and will present critiques of the 
Court‟s reasoning from this perspective. In general, I will ignore the material facts of the case, as 
these were largely discussed in the preceding section. I will employ several metrics in evaluating 
this reasoning, including (but not limited to) 1) the language of the Two Principles, 2) the fair 
value provision, 3) the value of stability, 4) the value of publicity, and 5) the nature of the basic 
structure that will (or would) result therefrom. Finally, I will end this chapter with some remarks 
on the general trends in thought that emerge from these four cases. 
A: Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 
1. Opinion of the Court- Contribution and Expenditure Limits 
     The opinion of the Court was delivered per curiam in this case, and so the reasoning 
contained therein may not be ascribed to any particular justice. The Court first determines that 
the case at hand presented a true case or controversy as set forth in Article III, § 2 of the 
Constitution, thus allowing the Court jurisdiction to decide the case.1 Moreover, there was no 
question of standing, as “at least some of the appellants [had] a sufficient „personal stake‟” in the 
outcome of the case.2 Therefore, the only issues before the Court were those concerning the 
constitutionality of various challenged provisions of the FECA, as amended in 1974. 
     The Court first addresses the statute‟s caps on campaign contributions and expenditures. 
Following the decision in United States v. Classic (1941) (see above), the Court finds the 
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regulation of federal elections to fall under the constitutionally-granted authority of Congress.3 
As such, regarding contribution and expenditure limits, the Court would only consider whether 
the FECA violated the First and Fifth Amendments, as alleged by the appellants.4 First, the Court 
considers whether monetary contributions and expenditures invoke the First Amendment at all. 
In essence, this involves a determination of whether contributions and expenditures constitute 
„speech‟ or merely „conduct‟. Applying the reasoning found in United States v. O’Brien (1968), 
the Court determines that the spending of money related to political campaigns, while certainly 
constituting „conduct‟, also constitutes „symbolic speech‟.5 That is, although the exchange of 
funds is not in itself speech, activity of this kind aimed at political advocacy amounts to speech. 
The Court emphasizes that essentially all modes of political communication (e.g. television ads, 
radio messages, flyers, pamphlets, etc.) require the spending of money.6 Thus, to limit the 
amount one may spend/contribute is to effectively limit one‟s speech. 
      In deciding this point, the Court relies on past precedent that broadly defines expressive 
conduct as speech.7 Although the Court has traditionally contrasted „pure speech‟ with „mixed 
speech‟, or that which amounts to a combination of mere conduct and symbolic or expressive 
elements, the Buckley Court finds that political contributions and expenditures contain a 
sufficient degree of expressive content as to produce First Amendment protection. This results 
largely from the Court‟s determination that money and political communication are, in the 
modern arena of politics, inseparably intertwined. Does this accord with the Rawlsian conception 
of justice as fairness? In answering this question, we must look first and foremost to the First 
Principle and Rawls‟ corresponding discussion of the „political liberties‟. Notably, Rawls makes 
a distinction (absent in the U.S. Constitution) between the rights of freedom of speech and 
participation in the political process.8 Thus, it seems to me that conduct that is not in itself 
65 
 
speech, but which is aimed broadly at expressive advocacy, more neatly falls into the latter 
category. Political spending would, in the Rawlsian context, fall into the category of activities 
that includes (for example) joining a political party or volunteering at a campaign fundraiser. 
Neither of these activities constitutes speech in itself, but rather they are aimed at supporting or 
opposing particular candidates. While the categories of speech and participation share 
overlapping goals (namely, advocacy), they are certainly distinct. Accordingly, it is not clear that 
monetary expenses constitute speech in the Rawlsian sense. Given Rawls‟ lack of specific 
writing on this point, however, I am not fully committed to this interpretation. As we shall see, 
even if we grant the compliance of the Buckley Court‟s determination on this point with justice 
as fairness, we will find substantial space for criticism of Buckley in other respects. I will operate 
under this assumption in my foregoing discussion.  
     While the Court finds both contributions and expenditures to constitute speech, it does not 
find the FECA‟s limitation of these forms of speech to be equal in force. A limit on campaign 
expenditures “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression”, as such a ceiling decreases the 
total number of communications that a campaign may finance and thus the size of the audience 
to which it may appeal.9 In contrast, a limit on contributions from any particular individual does 
not significantly reduce the quantity of that individual‟s expression. This is because 
contributions, as „symbolic speech‟, indicate only a “general expression of support” and do not 
“communicate the underlying basis for that support”.10 For example, consider two persons A and 
B, both of whom wish to express support for candidate C. Person A gives $500 to candidate C, 
while person B gives $499 to candidate C. In the Court‟s estimation, the contribution of A does 
not communicate any (non-negligible) greater degree of support for C than that of B. While a 
curious and perhaps trivial distinction at first glance, the Court‟s reasoning here will be of 
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enormous significance concerning the upshot of the Buckley decision. 
     Appellants challenged the constitutionality of the FECA‟s contribution limits on three 
grounds: 1) violation of the First Amendment, 2) overbreadth, and 3) violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. Regarding (2), the Court concludes that the establishment of specific monetary 
limits does not over-broadly limit protected speech. While most who contribute large sums to 
candidates do not seek undue influence, such limits are necessary to prevent the appearance of 
corruption as well as its actuality.11 Regarding (3), the Court finds no evidence on the record to 
suggest that small contribution caps discriminate against minor parties or non-incumbents.12 
Accordingly, both (2) and (3) are dismissed, and I will not further discuss these challenges here. 
Instead, I will focus on the first challenge to FECA contribution limits: namely, that these limits 
violate the First Amendment‟s „speech‟ and „assembly‟ clauses. As mentioned above, the Court 
has already determined that contributions constitute political speech. As such, if Congress is to 
regulate this speech in compliance with the First Amendment, a „clear and compelling 
governmental interest‟ must exist to justify the regulation. The Court agrees with appellees that 
just such an interest exists: namely, the prevention of the “actuality and appearance of corruption 
resulting from large individual contributions”.13 The Court states that the solicitation of influence 
from candidates by means of monetary donations does harm to “the integrity of our system of 
representative democracy”.14 Moreover, the prevention of the appearance of such corruption is 
just as important: citizens cannot have faith in a system of representation that does not represent 
their own interests, even if this is not actually (or always) the case. As such, the various forms of 
contribution limits that the FECA sets forth meet the strict scrutiny test, and no facial violation of 
the First Amendment is present. 
     Regarding the FECA‟s expenditure limits, the Court considers First Amendment challenges to 
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three spending ceilings found in the statute, which concern 1) independent expenditures, 2) 
expenditures from a candidate‟s own funds, and 3) total campaign expenditures.15 The Court 
finds all three relevant provisions of the FECA (§ 608 (e)(1), § 608 (a), and § 608 (c)) to be 
constitutionality invalid. Because this determination is made (largely) for the same reasons for 
each provision, I will discuss all three provisions together. As stated before, the Court recognizes 
that all spending ceilings necessarily involve a limitation on the quantity of expression and, thus, 
a serious limitation of First Amendment freedoms. The Court must thus consider whether any of 
the aims of the FECA constitute a sufficiently-compelling governmental interest that will satisfy 
strict scrutiny. First, however, the Court discusses whether § 608 (e)(1)‟s limitation on 
independent expenditures is “unconstitutionally vague”.16 The provision sets limits on 
expenditures made “relative to a clearly identified candidate”, though as the Court notes, the 
statute contains no definition of what may be meant by „relative‟.17 In the Court‟s view, the only 
way to prevent this provision from being unconstitutionally vague is to interpret „relative‟ as 
follows: a political communication is made „relative‟ to a candidate if and only if it contains 
“explicit words of advocacy” regarding that candidate.18 These are the so-called „magic words‟ 
later discussed in the McConnell decision and are typically thought to include such terms as 
„elect‟, „defeat‟, „vote‟, „support‟, etc. Now, the Court‟s re-interpretation of § 608 (e)(1) saves 
the provision from the vagueness challenge but, as I will soon discuss, does not rescue it from 
the facial challenge of constitutionality. However, the „magic words‟ conclusion does establish 
an important precedent of distinction between „express‟ and „issue‟ advocacy.  
      Having thus considered an initial problem with the independent expenditures provisions, I 
will now discuss appellees‟ various proposed governmental interests for the licensure of 
limitations on expenditure speech. As before, the primary aim of the statute was the prevention 
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of apparent or actual corruption. However, the Court finds this interest to be insufficiently 
compelling for all three types of expenditure limits in the FECA: 1) independent expenditures, 2) 
expenditures from a candidate‟s own funds, and 3) total campaign expenditures. Regarding (1), 
the Court states that independent expenditures not made in connection with or coordination by 
the candidates may either help or hinder these candidates.19 An interest group which, for 
example, seeks to support a candidate X may actually harm X‟s chances at election by running a 
negative advertisement. Thus, there is no possibility of producing a significant appearance of 
corruption in this regard. Concerning (2), the interest of preventing corruption seems to make 
little sense.20 A candidate cannot presumably corrupt herself by use of her own money. 
Regarding (3), the limit on total campaign expenditures, the Court finds that the interest of 
preventing undue interest solicitation is sufficiently-served by the contribution limit and 
disclosure provisions.21 The reasoning here is thus: if the danger of corruption occurs because of 
large contributions from single donors, and if such large contributions are prohibited by the 
contribution cap provisions, then campaign expenditure limits are unnecessary to alleviate this 
danger. Given the high constitutional „cost‟ of expenditure limits, (3) does not pass strict 
scrutiny. Appellees also assert that the “ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the 
relative” [emphasis mine] political influence of citizens justifies the limits on speech present in 
(1), (2), and (3).22 Now, the justification of equalization will be of great consequence to my 
Rawlsian critique of Court reasoning for all four cases I will discuss. The Buckley Court, 
however, summarily rejects this claim as a compelling governmental interest in all three cases. 
The Court finds that any measures aimed toward ensuring a roughly-equal chance at political 
influence are “wholly foreign to the First Amendment”.23 It is not the role of the Court, 
according to this opinion, to guarantee „fairness‟ in the public forum of political speech. It is 
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instead the Court‟s task to promote “the widest possible dissemination of information”.24 
Accordingly, the Court finds unconstitutional provisions § 608 (e)(1), § 608 (a), and § 608 (c) of 
the FECA, as no compelling governmental interests exist to license the limitations on speech. 
     Now, I will assume first and foremost that the standard of strict scrutiny is a valid method for 
guaranteeing the compliance of law with the basic political liberties.25 Accordingly, the question 
at hand for us is thus: is the Buckley Court correct in recognizing such a compelling interest for 
the FECA‟s contribution caps but not for its expenditure limits? To begin, it is necessary to 
determine whether the appearance or actuality of corruption would, in the Rawlsian context, 
constitute a compelling interest. It should be clear that this is the case. To prevent actual 
corruption is to ensure the fair value of a citizen‟s right to political participation. If the wealthy 
may exert undue influence over the decisions of office-holders, then these elites enjoy a greater 
„value‟ for their claims to political participation than the less-advantaged. Moreover, prima facie, 
a system rife with corruption is patently unfair, thus contradicting a central aim of Rawls‟ 
project. To prevent the appearance of corruption is to satisfy the publicity requirement of a 
contractarian theory of justice. Citizens will be unable to know that others respect their own aims 
and ambitions if they believe that certain individuals have exploited the political system so as to 
gain an unfair advantage. This will prevent full public acceptance of the basic structure that 
constitutes this system and, thus, the principles of justice. In both cases, a society plagued by 
apparent or actual corruption will be unstable, thus failing the crucial stability requirement of a 
system of justice. That corruption trends toward instability should be obvious from the history of 
campaign finance presented in Chapter III: undue influence by wealthy elites has caused, in this 
country, both public outcry and serious efforts at reform.  
     Accordingly, if we accept strict scrutiny as the Rawlsian test for the constitutionality of 
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limitations on speech, then the Court‟s judgment regarding contributions caps is just.26 The same 
cannot be said for the invalidation of expenditure limits in Buckley. However, while the 
appearance or actuality of corruption may provide reasons for accepting these limits, it is, in my 
view, best to critique the Court‟s judgment in this regard apart from this interest. Other 
requirements for the basic structure present in Rawls‟ theory will better serve the role of 
satisfying strict scrutiny. To restate: we are concerned here with limits on 1) independent 
expenditures, 2) expenditures from a candidate‟s own funds, and 3) total campaign expenditures. 
How then would each of these provisions be justified via a compelling interest in the Rawlsian 
scheme? Regarding (1), the fair value of the liberty of political speech must be guaranteed. 
Consider two people, A and B, who wish to run independent advertisements in support of a 
particular candidate. Person A has $1,000 to spend on this effort, while Person B has $500,000. 
Person A can afford only a single, low-budget advertisement that will run late at night; Person B 
can afford a high-budget advertisement that will play on multiple channels at peak hours of 
viewership. Clearly, if both are allowed to do as was just described, the value of B‟s political 
speech will be significantly higher than that of A, in the relevant Rawlsian sense. Thus, to place 
limits on such expenditures will guarantee the fair value of this type of speech, and this ambition 
will constitute a compelling governmental interest.27  
     Concerning (2), the same reasoning applies. For the above example of persons A and B, 
simply make A and B candidates for federal office who wish to run advertisements in support of 
their own campaigns using their own funds. Let us assume that A and B have raised equal 
amounts of money in external fundraising. In such a case, a limit on personal expenditures is 
necessary to ensure fair value. For (3), the ceiling on total campaign spending, a different mode 
of critique is needed. Now, a non-Rawlsian criticism of the Court‟s rejection of (3) may hold that 
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rapidly-rising campaign costs are detrimental to general economic interests. For Rawls however, 
if we recognize the status of campaign expenditures as a political liberty, this line of objection 
will not work. This results from the lexical priority of the First Principle over the Difference 
Principle; i.e. we cannot “acknowledge a lesser liberty for the sake of greater material means”, 
even for society at large.28 It is not clear either that the notion of fair value necessitates (3), as 
limits on contributions and a candidate‟s personal spending may satisfy fair value without 
requiring a further reduction in liberty. However, (3) may be necessary for another reason: to 
ensure the equality of political liberty across the totality of the citizenry. As the Court rightly 
notes, practically any form of political communication in the modern era requires monetary 
expense. Accordingly, a candidate with a relatively small „war chest‟ will be able to access fewer 
media markets and means of self-promotion than a wealthier candidate. Now, the rights to vote 
and to participate fully in the political process are guaranteed equally to all citizens by the First 
Principle.29 In my view, an essential component of both rights is the ability to make informed 
decisions in selecting among candidates for office. An individual who lives outside contested 
„swing‟ states may only have access to media communications from wealthy candidates, thus 
impairing her ability to make an informed choice among all candidates. This limits her exercise 
of her political liberties relative to an individual who does live in a contested region. 
Accordingly, to guarantee the equality of basic liberties, it may be required by justice as fairness 
to also cap total campaign spending. This may be especially true for primary elections, where 
even solidly-Republican or Democrat states will experience competition among candidates.30  
     A Rawlsian basic structure would thus feature, in my view, all three forms of expenditure 
limits discussed above. Now, it is clear that the reinstatement of FECA provisions § 608 (e)(1), § 
608 (a), and § 608 (c) would not fully realize justice as fairness in federal election campaigns. As 
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I will soon discuss, more drastic reforms are necessary to achieve this goal. However, given my 
above remarks, it should be apparent that expenditure limits will generally be required of a 
Rawlsian scheme of distributive justice. These remarks have highlighted the more crucial points 
of contention between Rawls‟ work and the Court‟s jurisprudence on this matter. My discussion 
of the remainder of the Buckley decision, as well as the three other cases at hand, will thus be 
considerably briefer. My aim henceforth will primarily be to pick out of the Court‟s reasoning 
areas of congruence and divergence from the above.  
2. Opinion of the Court- Disclosure Requirements and Public Financing 
     The disclosure requirements of the FECA were described generally in the last chapter of this 
paper. Unlike the statute‟s contribution and expenditure provisions, the FECA‟s disclosure 
provisions were not challenged in Buckley as being per se unconstitutional. Instead, appellants 
alleged overbreadth, claiming that more narrowly-tailored reporting requirements would satisfy 
the intended aim of the statute without so strictly restricting First Amendment freedoms.31 The 
Court agrees that “compelled disclosure… can seriously infringe upon privacy of association and 
belief”.32 Accordingly, the relevant provisions of the FECA raise First Amendment concerns that 
must justified by a nexus between the requirement of reporting a legitimate governmental 
interest. The standard of scrutiny applied to such a determination, following NAACP v. Alabama 
(1958), is that of „exacting scrutiny‟.33 While a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, exacting 
scrutiny nevertheless requires that the limitations on liberty adopted be substantially connected to 
the achievement of a legitimate governmental interest. This generally requires the narrow 
tailoring of statutory measures; hence the constitutional challenge of overbreadth. 
     In policy areas deemed to be of great national importance, precedent dictates that disclosure 
and reporting requirement may meet this standard of exacting scrutiny.34 Thus, the Court 
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considers two primary questions in evaluating the constitutionality of the FECA disclosure 
provisions: does a governmental interest of sufficient national importance exist, and are these 
provisions narrowly-tailored to achieve this interest? Appellees offered three separate 
governmental interest to justify the statutory requirements, all of which the Court deems to be of 
the “magnitude” required by exacting scrutiny.35 These interests are: 1) providing information to 
the electorate so that citizens may evaluate the financial situations of candidates; 2) deterring 
actual corruption and preventing the appearance of corruption; and 3) providing enforcement 
agencies with the necessary information to “detect violations of the contribution limits”.36 To 
answer the second question above, the Court considers whether the FECA provisions are 
narrowly tailored to achieve these ends. Appellants argued that the disclosure requirements were 
overbroad, as they applied also to minor parties and independent candidates, for whom interests 
(1), (2), and (3) were not major concerns.37 While appellants called for a blanket exemption for 
these parties, the Court finds such an exemption unnecessary. Further, the Court determines that 
the dangers associated with unreported contributions are compelling for minor parties and 
independents as well as for major parties.38 Accordingly, provisions designed to guarantee 
disclosure and enforcement are narrowly aimed to prevent this danger. Finally, the Court 
considers a First Amendment challenge to § 434 (e), which requires individuals who contribute 
or spend over $100 in political campaigns in a year to report such spending to the FEC.39 The 
Court here applies the strict scrutiny standard, rather than exacting scrutiny, as this provision 
directly concerns the First Amendment guarantees of free association and privacy of belief for 
individuals.40 Nevertheless, the Court finds § 434 (e) constitutionally firm, as the provision 
survives scrutiny in concerns over overbreadth, vagueness, and the arbitrariness of monetary 
thresholds (i.e. the $100 threshold). Weighing these three concerns, the Court finds the three 
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governmental interests detailed above to be overriding. Accordingly, all disclosure and reporting 
requirements of the FECA are upheld by the Court.  
     In contrast with the last section of this paper, the Court‟s reasoning here largely conforms 
with a Rawlsian scheme of justice. I will briefly address the compliance of each governmental 
interest raised discussed above with justice as fairness. As before, interest (2), the prevention of 
apparent or actual corruption, is crucial for satisfaction of the requirements of fair value and 
publicity. Interest (1) is justified on the same grounds as was the FECA‟s cap on total campaign 
contributions. I take it to be an integral part of the rights of political participation and voting that 
citizens must have adequate information to make informed decisions. Because the financial 
backing of a candidate is necessary for such an evaluation, these rights cannot be adequately 
guaranteed with public access to disclosure reports, as the FECA guaranteed. Finally, the 
enforcement interest described by (3) is a necessary correlate of the (1) and (2). It was already 
stated that the prevention of actual corruption is necessary, in the Rawlsian scheme, to guarantee 
the fairness of election mechanisms built into a society‟s basic structure. Given the crucial 
importance of fairness to justice, the actual ability of relevant institutions to enforce measures to 
this end is required by justice as fairness.  
     I will now turn to appellants‟ challenge to the FECA‟s system of public financing for 
presidential elections: specifically, § 6069 of the FECA, which amended Subtitle H of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.41 Appellants claimed violations of the First and Fifth 
Amendments by § 6069; however, the Court finds no merit in these claims and upholds the 
public financing system. First, it was alleged that, by financing only some candidates (namely, 
those who elect to choose public financing), the statute promotes some speech over others.42 The 
Court rejects this analysis because the First Amendment prevents only the abridgment of free 
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speech, not its promotion. Congress is freely entitled to promote political speech, e.g. Congress 
may finance the construction of a building to be used for hosting political debates if it so 
chooses. Second, appellants claimed that, because Subtitle H imposes eligibility requirements for 
public funding (namely, requirements based on fundraising in past elections), the statute violates 
the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment‟s equal protection guarantees.43 The Court 
disagrees that any greater constraint is imposed on ineligible candidates than those who accept 
public funding. This is a result of the fact that publicly-funded candidates must accept 
expenditure limits, whereas those limits have been invalidated by the Court for privately-funded 
candidates.44 Thus, on the balance, the Court finds that the public financing system actually 
imposes greater limitations on the campaign efforts of those who accept public funding. 
Accordingly, § 6069 does not discriminate against minor parties and independents in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment. The entirety of the public financing system is upheld. 
     The reasoning here does not directly bear on the project of distributive justice. However, the 
system of public financing § 6069 puts in place is a central concern of the application of Rawls‟ 
thought to actual society. As I indicated earlier, Rawls believes that the public financing of 
elections may be the one of the most effective practical means by which to guarantee the fair 
value of political liberty.45 The reason for this claim are clear: the public funding of a candidate, 
to the exclusion of private financing, eliminates fair value concerns over influence solicited by 
monetary contributions. The need for contribution disclosure is thus also erased by this system 
for those who choose it. In addition, the Buckley decision leaves in place expenditure limits on 
publicly-funded campaigns, as such funding (and thus the limits) are accepted voluntarily. 
Accordingly, all of the concerns relevant to justice addressed by the FECA are solved, resolutely, 
by public financing. Of course, justice as fairness cannot be fully realized in this regard so long 
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as some (or in the current case, most) candidates do not choose public financing. As I will argue 
in Chapter V, the output of this consideration will require, in a Rawlsian scheme, mandatory 
public financing for all federal elections. I will discuss the plausibility of this claim at that time.  
     In conclusion, I have identified the various divergences and conformities of the Buckley 
decision with justice as fairness. I have ignored here the Court‟s invalidation of the then-existing 
procedure for FEC member appointment, as the constitutional issue raised by that provision 
(namely, the scope of congressional authority in appointing officers who hold executive power) 
is not directly relevant to my project. I have focused exclusively on those parts of the case which 
pertain to the topic at hand. As will be seen, the themes and legal principles discussed above will 
carry throughout the next three cases. I will now explore to what degree the Court has 
maintained or rejected these various principles. 
B: Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990) 
      In a six-to-three decision delivered on March 27, 1990, the Court upheld a Michigan statute 
that directly mirrored the language of the FECA. The case would profoundly shape the Court‟s 
jurisprudence on campaign finance until Citizens United v. FEC twenty years later. The majority 
opinion, which I will now explore, was authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall. 
      At issue was § 54 (1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act of 1976, which prohibited 
“corporations from making contributions and independent expenditures in connection with state 
election campaigns”.46 § 54 (1) essentially followed in the tradition of the Tillman Act and, most 
proximately, the FECA, although the prohibition was limited only to state election campaigns. 
The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce challenged the constitutionality of only the 
expenditures portion of the provision under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
constitutionality of relevant federal law banning direct corporate expenditures was not 
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challenged in Buckley, and so the Court‟s decision here bears on that issue. Following Buckley, 
the Court applies the strict scrutiny standard in this case, and thus must determine 1) whether the 
statute infringes on First and Fourteenth Amendment protections, and if so, 2) whether the statute 
is narrowly-tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.47  
      The Court first considers the challenge on First Amendment grounds. Following First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), the Court determines that independent expenditures 
made by a corporation‟s general treasury funds do constitute speech. Because § 54 (1) prohibits 
such speech, the provision is constitutionally firm if and only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling interest. Now, under Michigan law (and federal law), corporations were allowed to 
indirectly support election campaigns by establishing a “special segregated fund”.48 General 
treasury funds could be used only to finance the administration of the segregated fund, not to fill 
its coffers directly. Thus, both federal and Michigan law allowed corporations to advocate for or 
against candidates indirectly. Following Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Federal Election 
Commission (1986), the Court finds that both 1) the ban on direct corporate independent 
expenditures, and 2) the financial requirements for establishing a segregated fund, constitute 
burdens on the corporation‟s First Amendment freedoms.49 As such, if the statute is to be upheld, 
it must meet the standard of strict scrutiny.  
     To make that determination, the Court considers that State‟s claim that the danger of apparent 
or actual corruption constitutes a compelling interest. The Court finds that, while this familiar 
justification may be sufficient in some cases, the interest achieved by the statute is of a different 
variety. Instead, the Austin Court determines that § 54 (1) seeks to prevent the “corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form”.50 Essentially, the Court finds that the very nature of state-chartered corpor-
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ations, along with the benefits and privileges that arise therefrom, poses a danger to the fairness 
of election campaigns. Corporations possess the “special advantages… [of] limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets”, while 
individuals and non-corporate groups lack these benefits.51 Accordingly, corporations hold an 
unfair advantage over individual citizens in shaping the outcome of elections.  
     In the Court‟s view, this imbalance runs contrary to basic democratic ideals and will tend to 
do damage to the „representative‟ quality of our system of governance. In addition, the statute at 
hand seeks to address this wrong not by silencing the „voices‟ corporations, but rather by 
constraining them to the use of segregated funds. Because the corporations cannot directly 
contribute to these funds, individuals and non-corporate groups will have to do so. Thus, the 
statute merely guarantees that whatever „speech‟ results from the dispersal of these funds will 
“reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused” thereby.52 This aim is, in essence, 
the interest which the statute seeks to realize. The Court recognizes this governmental interest as 
being sufficiently compelling. Moreover, the Court finds that § 54 (1), because it prohibits direct 
corporate expenditures but allows corporations to still voice their views, is “precisely targeted” 
to achieve its aim.53 Thus, the statute is narrowly-tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest. The Court also dismisses appellants‟ Fourteenth Amendment challenge, which held that 
the statute‟s lack of inclusion of labor union and other organizations violated the equal protection 
clause. For reasons described above, the Court concludes that the statute‟s narrow focus on the 
dangers of the corporate form was appropriate.54  
     The Court‟s determination of the aforementioned compelling interest in this case bears 
directly on Rawls‟ project. Specifically, the Court seems to invoke a notion of fairness that, to 
some degree, roughly approximates the concept of fair value of political liberty. Contrary to 
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Buckley, the Austin Court finds it to be a compelling matter of governmental interest to guarantee 
the fairness of electoral systems. Where an entity possesses the potential to unfairly assert 
influence over the outcome of an election, it is constitutionally firm for the relevant legislature to 
address the imbalance. In this way, the legislature ensures the „fair value‟ of the power of each 
individual to exert influence over the political process. This in turn produces a system whereby 
the basic liberty of political participation is guaranteed its fair value for all natural persons. Now, 
it is important here not to overstate the compliance of the Court‟s reasoning with justice as 
fairness. Certainly the Court does not reason that the society‟s accepted principles of justice 
require a general guarantee of fair value for all political liberties. However, in my view, the 
Court‟s invocation of fairness as a compelling interest in itself seems to coincide with the spirit 
of Rawls‟ view. 
     However, another aspect of the Court‟s reasoning runs contrary to justice as fairness. 
Reiterating a worry first voiced in Buckley, the Court rejects Justice Scalia‟s claim that the 
Michigan statute amounts to an attempt to “equalize the relative influence of speakers on 
elections”.55 The implication here, as it was in Buckley, is that „equalizing‟ measures are not 
sufficient to justify constraints on First Amendment freedoms. The trend of the unilateral 
rejection of such measures will continue throughout the Court‟s jurisprudence. Now, this trend 
seems to be largely at odds with the First Principle and, specifically, the guarantee of fair value. 
In a sense, justice as fairness does require the equalization of the value attached to the various 
political liberties. However, these two claims may perhaps be reconciled. The Austin Court 
rejects any attempt to equalize the “influence” of individuals; here, I interpret this term to mean 
the actual influence that individuals assert over the outcome of elections. Because Rawls‟ project 
is not that of producing an outcome-based theory, we might say that Rawls also rejects the need 
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for such an aim. Rather, justice as fairness requires a basic structure that equalizes the potential 
influence of speakers on elections. In other words, citizens must have roughly-equal chances at 
being able to shape the outcomes of elections. Whether or not the Austin Court would accept 
such a reformulation is largely a speculative question. Ultimately, I will conclude that the notion 
of „fair value‟ is at least largely consistent with the Court‟s reasoning in Austin.  
     The majority opinion in Austin marks a significant departure from Buckley in the Court‟s 
reasoning on issues of campaign finance. While the underlying foundation remains the same- 
that is, the recognition that strict scrutiny will be required as a threshold condition for campaign 
finance reformative measures- the Austin decision broadens the parameters of acceptable 
limitations on First Amendment protections in this regard. This trend will continue in the next 
case discussed. 
C: McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003)  
     As described above, the McConnell case consisted of a number of combined challenges to the 
constitutionality of the BCRA of 2002. Because almost all of the major provisions of the statute 
were challenged by appellants, the Court‟s opinion is long and complicated, with the authorship 
of the opinion divided among four separate justices. As such, I will not attempt here a section-
by-section critique of the opinion of Court, as has been done for the other three cases under 
examination. Instead, I will explore the broad contours of the Court‟s reasoning regarding the 
most important provisions of the BCRA. 
     The most important provisions of the BCRA are found within Titles I and II of that statute. 
These measures include various provisions intended to: 1) discontinue the sweeping use of „soft 
money‟ in federal election campaigns, and 2) regulate the financing and distribution of 
„electioneering communications‟.56 New FECA § 323 (as amended by the BCRA) generally 
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prohibits the solicitation and distribution of soft money in federal election efforts, and the major 
provisions of this portion of the BCRA are upheld by the Court. In doing so, the majority rejects 
appellants‟ facial First Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of § 323. The Court here 
applies the “less rigorous standard of review… [of] „closely drawn‟ scrutiny”, as differentiated 
from strict and exacting scrutiny.57 Closely drawn scrutiny is applicable to § 323 because this 
provision of the BCRA largely deals with the solicitation of soft money contributions, rather than 
expenditures. (The sweeping prohibitions on soft money solicitation enacted by § 323 generally 
negate the possibility of soft money expenditures in the relevant circumstances). As first 
described by the Court in Buckley and discussed above, contribution limits involve a relatively-
minor infringement on speech because the amount set for contributable money does not directly 
affect one‟s ability to vocalize support for a candidate. Once more, the governmental issue 
offered to justify this minor limitation in § 323 is the prevention of actual or apparent 
corruption.58 The Court finds this interest to be sufficient to satisfy the standard of closely drawn 
scrutiny. The Court also rejects appellants‟ claim that Title I exceeds congressional authority to 
regulate state elections59 and dismisses the argument that Title I violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment‟s equal protection clause.60 The latter claim asserted that the BCRA discriminates 
against political parties in favor of non-party groups (i.e. special interest groups); however, the 
Court found that, in many cases, the BCRA actually favors organized parties. Accordingly, the 
major soft money provisions of the BCRA are upheld by the Court.  
     The BCRA also amends FECA § 304, which sets forth disclosure and reporting requirements 
for media communications. Intending to close the „issue advocacy loophole‟, § 304 broadens the 
scope of existing law to regulate all “electioneering communication”.61 The term here is defined 
as any media communication which 1) “clearly identifies a candidate”, 2) is aired within sixty or 
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thirty days of a general or primary election, respectively, and 3) is “targeted to the relevant 
electorate”.62 Appellants alleged that the term conflates „issue‟ and „express‟ advocacy, where 
the latter is defined (according to Buckley) by the use of „magic‟ words‟, and asserted that the 
First Amendment right to the former category is inviolable.63  The McConnell Court rejects this 
distinction, holding that the Buckley decision on this matter was merely one of statutory 
interpretation. The Court finds that the use of „magic words‟ does not define express advocacy 
and that replacement term „electioneering communication‟ suffers from no concern over 
vagueness or overbreadth.64 Accordingly, the Court upholds the constitutionality of amended § 
304‟s regulation of such communications. For the same reasons given by the Buckley Court in 
upholding the FECA‟s disclosure requirements (namely, the presence of the three compelling 
governmental interests discussed above), it also upholds the BCRA‟s disclosure provisions 
regarding electioneering communications.  
     The Court also upholds BCRA § 203, which prohibits the use of corporate or labor union 
general treasury funds in the financing of electioneering communications within sixty days of 
general elections and thirty days of primary elections.65 As in the Austin case, segregated funds 
may still be used to this end. Once more, the Court recognizes that this provisions burdens 
corporate speech, but recognizes the existence of compelling governmental interests to license 
the limitation: the prevention of apparent or actual corruption, as well as the dangers of the 
corporate form.66 This provision of the BCRA will be of particular importance to the next (and 
final) section of this chapter, in which I will discuss the Citizens United decision. In that case, the 
Court will overrule its decision here regarding § 203. It is important to note here that the Court 
does recognize the existence of a danger of apparent or actual corruption that is sufficiently 
compelling to limit corporate speech in the form of electioneering communications, which 
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constitute independent campaign expenditures. The Court further finds on the record that, prior 
to the BCRA‟s adoption, the number of corporate-financed electioneering communications had 
rapidly increased.67 For the McConnell Court, this trend presented a clear danger sufficient to 
satisfy the conditions of the strict scrutiny standard.  
     I have outlined here the Court‟s reasoning in upheld the most important provisions of the 
BCRA. I have necessarily excluded discussion of many points of contention within McConnell, 
especially those found within the Court‟s consideration of Titles III-V. However, the 
constitutional challenges to the two major aims of the statute- that is, the regulation of soft 
money and electioneering communications- have been addressed. I will now turn to the Rawlsian 
critique of the Court‟s decision on these major points. The comparison here largely follows from 
what has been said before: for FECA § 323 and BCRA § 203, the Court recognizes a compelling 
governmental interest constituted by the danger of apparent or actual corruption. For FECA        
§ 304, the burdens on speech produced by disclosure requirements are justified by appeal to the 
same interests as maintained to that effect in Buckley: 1) the public availability of information of 
candidates‟ finances; 2) the danger or apparent or actual corruption; and 3) the ability of 
enforcement agencies to detect violations of the statute. In my discussion of the Buckley and 
Austin cases, I elaborated on the compliance of each of these justifications with the first 
principle. The congruence also holds true here. Regarding the two provisions of the BCRA that 
McConnell does invalidate, these measures are generally-speaking so minor as to not merit 
extensive consideration.68 Thus, we may that the Court‟s reasoning in this case is largely 
consistent with both past precedent and with justice as fairness. This claim should not be 
interpreted to mean that the regulatory regime established by the BCRA in 2002 and the 
McConnell decision in 2003 modeled justice as fairness, even approximately. While the BCRA 
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certainly made significant strides toward ensuring a fairer value of political liberty for U.S. 
citizens, it fell far short of  altering the basic structure of American society so as to realize 
Rawls‟ favored conception of justice. The reformative measures that would be required to do so 
will be discussed further in Chapter V. 
     I will conclude this section with a few further remarks on the reasoning exhibited by the 
majority in McConnell. It should be apparent from my above discussion that the Court does not 
speak of fairness, or of ensuring the fair potential for political influence, as a justification for 
constraints on monetary speech. That particular feature of the Austin decision is conspicuously 
absent in this case. As will become apparent following my exploration of Citizens United, the 
Austin decision is somewhat aberrant in that respect. It is, in my view, the point at which the 
Court‟s jurisprudence on campaign finance most closely approaches the relevant portions of 
Rawls‟ theory of justice. The reasons for its absence in the other three cases are largely unclear, 
although I will venture a speculative claim to that effect. On my reading, the notion of the fair 
potential for influence strays too near the concept of an „equalizing‟ measure, which the Court 
has routinely rejected as a compelling governmental interest. What conclusion may we draw 
from this claim? While the Court‟s reasoning in campaign finance cases at times complies with 
justice as fairness, the spirit or motivation behind the former is essentially non-Rawlsian.  
D: Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 
     I turn now to the most recent case decided by the Court in the area of campaign finance, 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010). The case resulted in a split decision and 
a majority opinion authored by Anthony Kennedy. The ultimate effect of the decision was the 
invalidation of the major provisions of BCRA § 203, a result which overturned Austin and one 
portion of McConnell (namely, Part VII, which dealt with § 203). Having already described the 
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material facts of the case, I will now proceed with my critique of the majority opinion. 
     At issue are three portions of the BCRA: § 203, which modified § 441b of the FECA to 
prohibit corporate/union funding of electioneering communications, and BCRA § 201 and 311, 
which set forth reporting and disclosure requirements for such communications.69 Appellant 
corporation Citizens United challenged the facial constitutionality of § 203 and raised an as-
applied challenge also, alleging that Hillary (the communication it sought to distribute) was not 
properly governed by § 203. The latter challenge largely involves problems of statutory 
interpretation that are not directly relevant to the project at hand. As such, I will ignore the 
Court‟s consideration of the as-applied challenge, found in Parts I-II of the majority opinion. It 
will be sufficient to say that the Court determines that Hillary “qualifies as the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy” funded directly by a corporation‟s general treasury, which is 
prohibited for distribution by both FECA § 441b and BCRA § 203.70 The Court also finds that 
Citizens United qualifies as an economic corporation (albeit a non-profit) and thus does not 
qualify as an ideological corporation exempted from § 441b (as appellants in Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc. v. FEC (1986) were so considered).71 The Court declines to “carve out an 
exemption to § 441b… for nonprofit corporate speech funded overwhelmingly by individuals”, 
such as Hillary.72 A final non-facial issue concerns appellants‟ alleged waiver of their earlier 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of BCRA § 203 and FECA § 441b on First Amendment 
grounds. While it is apparent that Citizens United, to some degree, abandoned the facial 
challenge in initial oral argument, the Court invokes precedent73 to consider the constitutionality 
of these two provisions regardless. As such, appellants‟ as-applied challenges are dismissed and 
the Court turns to consideration of the facial challenge. 
     Following Buckley, the Court interprets BCRA § 203 (and thus, the amended § 441b) as a 
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limitation on the amount that an entity can spend on communication and, thus, a constraint on the 
amount of speech it may produce.74 § 203 thus imposes a sort of expenditure ceiling on 
independent campaign spending by corporations and labor unions, although in most cases, the 
ceiling is set at zero dollars. In Buckley, ceilings of this sort were found unconstitutional when 
imposed on political campaigns themselves; Austin found them to be constitutionally firm when 
applied to corporations and unions. The Court will now reconsider the Austin ruling to determine 
whether the reasoning in Buckley should be extended to independent expenditures as well. 
Accordingly, the strict scrutiny standard will once more be applied, and if the provision is not 
found to be narrowly-tailored to achieve a sufficiently compelling governmental interest, it will 
be invalidated. Following Bellotti, the Court notes that the First Amendment generally prohibits 
discrimination against classes of speakers as well as the speech itself.75 The Court finds § 203 to 
fulfill this description. In Austin, as described above, the Court found a compelling interest 
(namely, the dangers of the corporate form) which licensed a speaker-based discrimination. The 
reversal of Austin in this case is primarily due to a rejection of that rationale.  
     The governmental interest featured in Austin, that which I have referred to as prevention of 
the „dangers of the corporate form‟, is here termed the “antidistortion interest”.76 This refers to 
the Austin Court‟s finding that the corporate form itself poses the danger of distorting the 
influence of public opinion on election outcomes. The Citizens United Court rejects this interest 
as sufficient for satisfying strict scrutiny. The Court notes that this rationale could be applied to 
limit the speech of corporations in areas other than campaign finance, such as the publication of 
a book.77 Because the antidistortion interest does not invoke, for example, the appearance or 
actuality of corruption, it is not specific to matters involving election campaigns. The Court thus 
recognizes a substantial danger to the First Amendment‟s protection of corporate freedom if the 
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Austin rationale were to be maintained. The antidistortion interest could, presumably, also be 
extended to license limitations on the speech of media corporations, thus substantially interfering 
with the ability of the press to disseminate information.78 Although the BCRA exempts media 
corporations from § 203, the acceptance of Austin would nevertheless allow Congress (in theory) 
to undo the exemption and seize control of the press.79 However, perhaps most important of all in 
the Court‟s reasoning is that which was already discussed: the fact that the antidistortion interest 
licenses First Amendment restrictions based on the speaker, not the speech. While certain forms 
of speech are certainly not protected by the constitution (e.g. obscenities), the Court finds 
speaker-based restrictions to be “aberrant” and “unprecedented” in its jurisprudence.80 
Accordingly, the Court rejects the antidistortion interest as a compelling governmental interest. 
In doing so, the Court invalidates both BCRA § 203 and FECA § 441b, as the general ban on 
independent corporate and labor union expenditures cannot be maintained. The Buckley 
reasoning on expenditure ceilings in other circumstances is thus applied here, resulting in the 
overruling of Austin and Part VII of McConnell.  
     The Court further considers, and upholds, the constitutionality of BCRA § 201 and 311, the 
statute‟s disclosure and reporting requirements. It is not necessary to discuss here the relevant 
portions of the Court‟s opinion. These provisions are upheld largely by the same rationale 
employed in Buckley and McConnell: that preventing the appearance or actuality of corruption, 
along with the importance of publicly-accessible financial information and enforcement 
mechanisms, satisfies the standard of strict scrutiny.81 That being said, I will now turn to my 
Rawlsian critique of the Court‟s decision regarding § 203. As the majority notes, the Court is 
here confronted with “confronted with conflicting lines of precedent”: that of Austin and that of 
Buckley.82 As I have previously noted, the line of precedent exemplified in Austin most closely 
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approaches the reasoning underlying justice as fairness. As such, the Rawlsian mode of criticism 
regarding this case should be initially obvious. Whereas the so-called antidistortion rationale 
roughly approximates Rawls‟ notion of fair value, it cannot be dismissed as contrary to political 
liberty. Instead, such an interest must be achieved so as to guarantee the full force of the First 
Principle. Ultimately, we have arrived a stark divergence point between Rawlsian and Court 
reasoning: the jurisprudence of the latter has, following Citizens United, reject a centrally-
important requirement of the theory of the former. Thus, we may say that, in the relevant 
Rawlsian sense, the Court‟s decision is unjust. 
     Of course, this blanket claim is over-simplistic and requires further elaboration. Now, the 
concerns that the majority raises over the antidistortion rationale are certainly valid. If the 
rationale were to license such restrictions on liberty, it would be plainly unjust. However, I 
believe that the Court here misreads the Austin decision in an important way. The compelling 
interest identified in Austin is not merely that of preventing the distortion of opinion by 
corporations. Rather, the Austin Court held that the corporate form, by virtue of the greater 
benefits it confers on its possessors, unfairly empowers corporations with a greater potential for 
influence than that which is granted to individual citizens. The notion of fairness is, I believe, 
crucial to an understanding of the Austin opinion. It is also that which ties the antidistortion 
rationale most closely to Rawls‟ favored conception, justice as fairness. Given this under-
standing, we can see that Austin does not after all license the grave injustices that the majority 
notes here. The publication of a book by a corporation, or the dissemination of information by a 
media corporation, cannot be said to represent an unfair imbalance of potential influence. Why is 
this the case?  
     The distinction results from the fact that the antidistortion interest, properly construed, models 
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the notion of fair value. According to the First Principle, a fully adequate and universally-
compatible scheme of liberty is to be achieved, subject to the constraint of fair value. It would be 
unjust, given the adoption of this principle, to limit liberty further than what is required by fair 
value. The above troubling cases are not, on my view, required to guarantee the fair value of 
political liberty. To put the point more precisely, a basic structure in conformity with justice as 
fairness may contain institutions designed to limit corporate independent campaign expenditures, 
but it would not require constraints on the speech of media corporations (generally). Now, 
certainly an ideal society well-ordered around justice as fairness would go farther, in the area of 
campaign finance, than to merely restrict corporate independent expenditures and impose general 
expenditure ceilings. To determine the features of such an ideal basic structure, we will return 
once more to realm of theory in the next chapter. With my above critique of current United 
States Supreme Court jurisprudence on campaign finance, we have identified many of the main 
problems that prevent realization of justice as fairness in modern America. I shall now attempt to 
more broadly define the parameters of what a Rawlsian program for reforming the U.S. system 
of campaign finance would entail.  
 
Chapter V: Rawlsian Program for Campaign Finance Reform 
     In the last two chapters, I detailed many of the problems of justice facing the current U.S. 
system of federal campaign finance. In this chapter, I will outline in broad strokes a proposal for 
reform that will, on my understanding of Rawls, realize justice as fairness in this particular 
context to a much higher degree. I will begin with a review of the relevant secondary literature 
on the subject matter at hand. After reviewing the proposals set forth by various philosophers, I 
will determine which (if any) of these accounts seems most plausible. Finally, I will draw from 
these commentators‟ work to produce the basic outline of a program for reform. 
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     It is important to note at the outset that both my remarks and those of the philosophers under 
scrutiny will apply only to the modern American context. I will not consider questions of how 
justice as fairness should best be realized in the campaign finance systems of other nations. The 
program of reform that I will offer will not be neatly applicable to problems of justice in other 
countries, even other advanced, industrialized Western democracies. The task at hand is a fact-
sensitive inquiry. The history, culture, economic standing, technological prowess, etc. of a 
society must be taken into direct consideration when performing such an analysis. It may be 
speculated that the proposals I will advance here will roughly apply also to relevantly similar 
nations, i.e. Western European constitutional democracies. This may be the case, but I will not 
consider such a topic here. Instead, I will focus solely on the question of reforming the U.S. 
system of federal campaign finance so as to best realize justice as fairness.  
A: Review of Secondary Literature 
1. Joshua Cohen- “Money, Politics, Political Equality” 
     In this paper, Cohen sets out, much as I have done, to critique Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on issues of campaign finance. Cohen‟s central thesis holds that the Court has, in Buckley and 
subsequent cases discussed above, provided an “unduly narrow conception of democracy and the 
role of citizens”.1 To prove this point, Cohen defines a principle of political equality to govern 
the fair terms of collective decision-making. He then applies this principle to the question of U.S. 
federal campaign finance, finding that the Court‟s decisions in the relevant cases fail to realize 
the principle. This principle has three components: “1. equal rights of participation…; 2. a strong 
presumption in favor of equally weighted votes; and 3. equal opportunities for effective political 
influence…”2 As Cohen makes clear, he strongly follows Rawls in formulating such a principle. 
Indeed, the three components of the principle may be said to articulate a limited case of Rawls‟ 
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First Principle: namely, the parts of the First Principle which apply to political liberty.3 The first 
component merely restates Rawls‟ political liberties, as listed above in Ch. II and discussed 
further in Ch. IV. The second component flows naturally from the listing of the right to vote 
among the political liberties, along with the guarantee that this right be distributed equally. The 
third component is of the most interest to us here: as the author makes clear, this is Cohen‟s 
equivalent of Rawls‟ notion of the fair value of the political liberties.4 In sum, we can read 
Cohen‟s principle of political equality as a limited case of the reading of the First Principle that I 
have offered throughout this paper.  
     Cohen interprets fair value in the same fashion as I did above: fair value requires “that people 
who are equally motivated and equally able to play this role [that of the political participant]… 
ought to have equal chances to exercise such influence”.5 Once more, the equality of influence 
guaranteed here is not one of actual outcome, but rather one of potential outcome. Relevantly-
similar persons must have roughly-equal chances at influencing the political system to a similar 
degree. The demands of such a principle will be great; after all, it is not enough to merely meet a 
threshold condition (i.e. a guaranteed minimum) of opportunity of influence.6 Moreover, it is not 
enough to guarantee equal opportunity for influence over just the election of office-holders. 
Instead, a just society must ensure equal chances for influencing the decisions of these officer-
holders after the election as well.  
     Much as I have done, Cohen identifies the central problem with the current system of 
campaign finance as being one of fairness. The rights of participation and voting enshrined in the 
First Principle are, first and foremost, rights to exert influence. However, “when money is as 
important a political resource as it is in our current system”, the power of potential influence is 
not fairly distributed.7 This is to say that the fair value of the political liberties is not guaranteed. 
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Thus, the root problem is the harmful entanglement of money and political influence. 
Accordingly, Cohen favors a robust system of campaign finance restrictions that would limit 
expenditures as well as contributions, in opposition to Buckley. Cohen considers the Buckley 
Court‟s reasoning in overturning the FECA‟s expenditure ceilings on the grounds that such 
provisions 1) limit the quantity of speech produced, and 2) do so absent a compelling interest to 
that end. As should be apparent, he disagrees with such a conclusion. As I described above, a 
compelling interest in limiting expenditures exists in the notion of fair value. Moreover, Cohen 
finds nothing objectionable in the mere limitation of the quantity of speech, so long as consists in 
a “content- and viewpoint-neutral regulation”.8  
     The most powerful argument against a limitation on quantity of speech claims that such a 
measure would be contrary to “the ideal of democracy itself”.9 The claim is this: expenditure 
limits are based on a collective determination of how much speech should be allowed, when in a 
democratic system, individual citizens should make such a decision. The legislature should not 
decide for each citizen how much information on candidates is required to make an informed 
judgment. Cohen produces two responses to this argument. First, the rationale behind his defense 
of expenditure limits is not that this party should decide the permissible quantity of speech rather 
than that party. Instead, the argument for expenditure ceilings is based on appeal to a “principle 
of political fairness”, i.e. the notion of fair value.10 As such, it is inaccurate to characterize his 
proposal as requiring a transition of responsibility from individuals to the collective. Second, 
while the objection appeals to the notion of democracy, it fails to consider one central aspect of 
the democratic ideal. The objection (and Buckley, in Cohen‟s view) “casts citizens principally in 
the role of audience”, whereas citizens in a democracy are also “agents, participants, [and] 
speakers”.11 Expenditure limits do not constrain the role of citizens as spectators; instead, they 
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guarantee the fair value of their role as active participants in the political process. Citizens do not 
(or should not) merely sit back and watch the process unfold, but should rather engage fully in 
the election and decision-making of their representatives. However, in Cohen‟s estimation, the 
current system‟s wholesale dependence on money prevents most citizens from taking up this 
role. It is this imbalance which fair value-aimed expenditure limits are intended to correct.  
     On the whole, Cohen‟s analysis of the problems at hand is consistent with the conclusions I 
have already reached in this paper. However, as he freely admits, he does not “defend a 
particular proposal for reforming the system”.12 Cohen simply finds fault with the Court‟s 
reasoning and argues for the restatement of those FECA provisions that the Court struck down in 
Buckley. As such, Cohen‟s proposal for campaign finance reform includes, at the very least, 1) 
strict contribution limits, 2) strict expenditure limits, and 3) disclosure and reporting require-
ments. In my view, the achievement of (1), (2), and (3) will not render the system sufficiently 
just. While Cohen defends the notion of a voluntary system of public financing, he does not call 
for the installation of a mandatory public finance system. It is for such a program of reform that I 
will argue later in this chapter.  
2. David Estlund- “Political Quality” 
     Estlund sets out here to defend what he terms the “epistemic approach” to the structuring of 
political systems.13 Such an approach seeks to reconcile the tension between political equality 
and the “quality of democratic procedures”;14 that is, between political equality and political 
quality. In other words, Estlund is concerned with a conflict between equal access to 
participation in democratic processes and the ability of those processes to produce good results. 
Estlund focuses on the epistemic value of democratic institutions, or “their tendency to produce 
decisions that are correct by the appropriate independent moral standards”.15 On this view, 
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democratic processes, such as elections, are seen as mechanisms by which a body of persons 
may make decisions of collective importance. According to Estlund, the quality of citizens‟ 
rights of participation (i.e. the value of the political liberties) must be guaranteed to some degree, 
or else these processes will fail to reflect collective decision-making. However, he denies that 
political quality must be guaranteed equally, or roughly equally, as Rawls‟ notion of fair value 
would require. In other words, Estlund claims that we should “accept substantive inequalities of 
political input” in order to ensure a higher quality of democratic institutions as a whole.16  
      It should be clear from these prefatory remarks that, unlike Cohen, Estlund does not strictly 
follow Rawls in his thinking. Both Estlund and Rawls require of democratic societies the 
„formal‟ equality of political liberties, i.e.  that each person has an equal right to freedoms of 
speech and association, to vote, to participate in politics, etc. However, they diverge on the 
question of „substantive‟ equality: whether the value of these liberties must also be guaranteed 
equally. This is to say that Estlund denies the need for the „fair value‟ provision of the First 
Principle.17 Now, it was said earlier that it is not my aim in this paper to defend Rawls‟ view 
from criticism, but rather to apply his theory to the particular case of campaign finance. This 
remains the case. I discuss Estlund‟s paper here for two main reasons. First, his view remains 
largely consistent with that of Rawls‟ (at least in the respects relevant to my project) with the 
single exception of fair value. Second, Estlund‟s discussion of a scheme of campaign finance 
absent a fair value guarantee will be instructive by contrast. Given the central importance of fair 
value to my critique of the current campaign finance system, such a contrast will better highlight 
the reformative measures that will be necessary if the fair value of the political liberties is to be 
realized.  
     Estlund focuses on the question of whether potential influence over the outcomes of 
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democratic processes should be made roughly equal. As such, he addresses the same core 
problem that both Cohen and the Austin Court discuss. He makes it clear that political 
egalitarians- those who, like Rawls, would guarantee both formal and substantive political 
equality- do not require equalization of all inequalities in potential influence. Natural 
inequalities, such as “social connections, good looks, debating skill,” etc., are not subject to just 
arrangement under a society‟s basic structure and thus will not be considered.18 As with Cohen, 
his view is narrowly constrained to consider only “the insulation of political influence from 
differential wealth or social rank”.19 Estlund rightly takes the First Principle‟s guarantee of fair 
value to principally concern these inequalities, and thus the criticisms of Rawls he offers bear 
directly on the problem of campaign finance. The shape of his argument is this: some inequalities 
in political quality will, if tolerated, improve the output of democratic collective-decision 
procedures.  
     The force of the argument derives from Rawls‟ Difference Principle, under which economic 
inequalities are permissible so long as they improve the situation of the least-advantaged social 
group. Where differences in wealth and income will improve the condition of all people in a 
society, there is no reason not to accept such inequalities. After all, the least-advantaged under 
such a scheme will find themselves in better circumstances than they would if an egalitarian 
scheme were put in place. Estlund argues that the same will be true of the political liberties: we 
should allow inequalities in the substantive worth of political liberty if it will improve the value 
of those liberties for the least-advantaged.20 Estlund believes that some such inequalities will 
improve the epistemic quality of democratic institutions; that is, that they will lead to more just 
outcomes from collective decision procedures. If such an arrangement is acceptable in regard to 
economic and social standing, why should it not be so for political liberty?  
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      I will not provide a summary here of Estlund‟s arguments as to why an unequal distribution 
of substantive liberty would be Pareto-superior to one in which fair value is guaranteed, i.e. a 
basic structure governed by justice as fairness as described. Once more, it is not my purpose to 
defend Rawls from such criticisms or to determine the strength of Estlund‟s objections. I should 
note that, in my view, Estlund is incorrect in claiming that the positing of fair value in Rawls‟ 
work derives solely from the empirical argument that inequalities in political quality will not 
increase total political liberty. I believe that the First Principle will require rough equality in 
substantive liberty even if this claim were false. While parties to the original position would be 
able to accept a reduction in economic equality to ensure greater prosperity for the least-
advantaged, they would not be willing to do the same in the case of liberty. This assumes that the 
parties place liberty in a more favored position than wealth, income, or status; hence the lexical 
ordering of the Two Principles. Of course, if this is correct, it merely shows that Estlund‟s 
criticisms are not internal to Rawls‟ theory. The view he espouses may be superior to that of 
Rawls by an external comparison between the two theories. I will now examine the implications 
for Estlund‟s view for the issue of campaign finance. 
     Estlund asks us to consider the equal arrangement of substantive political liberty (i.e. one 
governed by fair value) with the highest possible degree of epistemic quality for its democratic 
institutions. By epistemic quality, he means the arrangement with the greatest total amount of 
input into the political process, such as expressive speech. He terms such a distribution “E-
maxx”.21 The question at hand is this: does an unequal arrangement of substantive political 
liberty exist that will produce democratic processes of greater epistemic quality than E-maxx? If 
so, his arguments above would entail that such an arrangement should be adopted. Estlund 
proposes one possible hypothetical distribution where this would be the case. He asks us to 
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consider a society currently at the E-maxx level, that is, where potential political input is equally 
guaranteed.22 In this society, campaign expenditure and contribution limits are firmly set. A new 
“Progressive Voucher” system is introduced, whereby campaigns may spend more than 
previously allowed.23 The first Progressive Voucher is given freely to all campaigns and may be 
redeemed for a certain amount x. Candidates may purchase as many vouchers as they wish, but 
all vouchers will be worth x dollars. All vouchers after the first must be purchased at the 
following rate: voucher 2 = (x + 1 dollars); voucher 3 = (x + 2 dollars), etc. The money collected 
by the government from candidates who purchase multiple vouchers is then used to finance the 
first voucher, available for free to all candidates. Such a system features an unequal distribution 
of the worth of the political liberties, i.e. the right to influence election outcomes. Candidates 
who collect more funds may purchase more vouchers (we assume that contribution limits are set 
a relatively low amount). However, such a system increases the total amount of input into the 
political process without producing any gratuitous inequalities in substantive value. Candidates 
must still collect the money used to buy vouchers from individual contributors, and the low 
contribution limit ensures that candidates who purchase many vouchers will do so only after 
collecting funds from many individuals. In Estlund‟s view, such a hypothetical arrangement 
improves the democratic process as a whole, even though fair value is not guaranteed. 
     Such a system would clearly be incompatible with justice as fairness on the interpretation that 
I have offered thereof. However, Estlund‟s work does provide a clear contrast that will be useful 
in the next section of this paper. In Estlund‟s hypothetical system, departure from E-maxx only 
occurs where aggregate input could be achieved by producing inequalities in the value of the 
political liberties. Specifically, such inequalities arise when differential wealth is allowed to play 
a substantial role in determining potential influence on the political process. Estlund does not 
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consider (and for good reason, I believe) the possibility of allowing social standing or other 
factors to influence potential input. As such, his paper serves to highlight the central target of my 
own: the role of inequalities of wealth in reducing the equality of substantive value. Thus, if we 
are to produce a system of campaign finance compatible with justice as fairness, we must 
eliminate (to a degree of practical possibility) the influence of differential wealth on elections 
and political decision-making. The removal of such influence is, in my view, an essential 
component of the effort to guarantee the fair value of the political liberties. Following my brief 
remarks to follow, I will consider how the modern American system of campaign finance could 
be reformed so as to remove the influence of differential wealth. If citizens are to have roughly-
equal chances at influencing the democratic process, stricter measures than have been adopted so 
far must be put in place. As I will stress, this arises principally out of a concern for fairness.  
3. Other Remarks 
     I take these two papers, those of Cohen and Estlund, to be broadly representative of the 
current literature on the subject at hand. Few authors have written specifically on the question of 
a Rawlsian approach to campaign finance reform; where they have, it has mostly been in passing   
during more general commentaries on Rawls. Furthermore, I have found no work that advances a 
specific proposal, in compliance with Rawls‟ theory, to address current issues with the American 
system of campaign finance. Cohen has simply criticized existing Court jurisprudence on the 
subject from a Rawlsian perspective. Estlund, although advancing a more specific proposal, 
departs from Rawls in a significant way, and his voucher system cannot be taken to be Rawlsian 
in character. As such, I take it upon myself to propose relevant reformative measures that are 
intended, first and foremost, to best realize justice as fairness in the current context.  
     Eric Freedman has also examined the status of Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue, 
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finding, much as I have, a large discontinuity between Rawls‟ philosophy and the Court‟s 
reasoning.24 Freedman also touches on possible means by a which justice as fairness could be 
better realized in the context of campaign finance. However, he focuses exclusively on campaign 
contribution limits, setting the issue of expenditure limits to the side.25 Although Freedman does 
claim that hard money contribution limits are set too high to realize fair value, the Court has 
consistently upheld the constitutionality of such limits (regardless of the actual dollar amount). 
As such, discussion of his argument to this point would add little to our current project. 
Moreover, the proposal that I will raise in the next section of this paper will render the need for 
adjustments in contribution limits moot. In addition, Freedman argues for the necessity of 
regulating soft money contributions as well as hard money donations.26 Because this paper 
predated the adoption of the BCRA and its soft money regulations, these points also are now 
essentially moot. Accordingly, I will go no further in explicating Freedman‟s paper.  
     Justin A. Nelson has argued that Rawls and others (e.g. Sunstein, Dworkin) stray from the 
correct path of critique by arguing that Buckley should be overruled.27 While these authors (and 
myself) have focused on criticizing the ruling in Buckley and subsequent cases, Nelson claims 
that an economic approach is preferable. He argues that we should conceive of the realm of 
campaign finance as a “marketplace”, in which both a supply side (campaign contributors) and a 
demand side (politicians who desire contributions to run campaigns) exist.28 Too much attention 
has been given in the campaign finance debate, says Nelson, to only the supply side, i.e. to 
limiting contributions and expenditures. Instead, we should focus our efforts in reducing the 
„demand‟ that causes politicians to seek out financial contributions. I am sympathetic to this 
analysis of the problem. However, I believe that the proposal I offer below will encompass the 
concerns of both Nelson and Rawls. In a system of voluntary public funding of elections, 
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substantial demand may still exist among those politicians who elect not to choose public 
financing. In a mandatory public financing scheme, however, this concern will evaporate.  
     This concludes my review of the relevant literature on the relation between Rawls‟ 
philosophy and the issue of campaign finance reform. As should be clear, relatively little work 
has been done on this specific subject so far. Even less work has been done regarding a specific 
(albeit skeletal) proposal for reconciling justice as fairness and the financing of U.S. federal 
elections. It is to this task that I now turn. 
B. Proposal for Reform 
     In this section, I will first offer an argument as to why a mandatory scheme of public 
financing should be adopted if justice as fairness is to be best realized in the modern American 
context. I will next provide a skeletal account of what such a system may look like. I have 
neither the space nor the expertise for a full policy recommendation in this regard; instead, I will 
attempt to draw out the broad parameters of a system compatible with justice as fairness. 
     A few notes on the limits of this proposal: first, I use the word mandatory here, as contrasted 
with voluntary. In the current U.S. campaign finance regime, candidates for president (and only 
for president) may voluntarily submit to a system of public financing for their campaigns. In a 
mandatory system, by contrast, each candidate for a certain type of office would be required to 
fund his or her campaign through public funds, to the exclusion of private funds. A mixed system 
of public and private funding is also possible. This is, to some degree, the system currently in 
place in the United States for presidential elections. Such a mixed system is not what I propose 
here. Instead, I propose what I call a mandatory exclusive public financing (MEPF) system, as 
contrasted with a mandatory inclusive (or mixed) system. Moreover, I intend to widen the scope 
of the existing public funding system to include president, vice-presidential, House, and Senate 
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elections. In sum, I propose that a mandatory exclusive system of public funding be put in place 
for all federal elections in the United States.    
1. Argument for Public Financing 
     The groundwork for the argument of this section has largely already been laid in the 
preceding chapters. It is thus only to state the argument in a semi-formal fashion. The conclusion 
of the argument will be, if sound, that a MEPF system will best realize justice as fairness in this 
context, as every problem of justice raised so far in this paper may be resolved through the 
installation of such a system.  
     I begin first with contribution limits. As we have seen, the Court has left the BCRA and the 
FECA‟s contribution limits intact. However, concerns remain (as addressed by Freedman above) 
that these limits are set too high and that not all forms of monetary donation are covered by 
existing law. An epistemic problem may also exist here: how are we to know the specific dollar 
amount that will, if set as a limit, prevent most persons from soliciting influence? Such a 
determination seems unlikely to ever be correctly made in practice. Moreover, even if we assume 
that the current limits prevent the actual solicitation of influence, it may be that the appearance 
of corruption will still remain. The current outcry over the influence of corporations and monied 
interests on the outcome of elections certainly seems to indicate as much. A final concern: a 
system with low contribution limits still requires politicians to solicit funds en masse from 
laypersons. This means that politicians spend a great deal of time raising funds and attending 
fundraising events, perhaps to the exclusion of their representative duties. A scheme of low 
contribution limits will presumably require politicians to spend more time fundraising than a 
scheme of higher limits, in which they may draw larger sums from smaller numbers of people. 
Thus, the very existence of contribution limits may do some harm to the quality of our 
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representative democracy. In a MEPF system, however, these concerns do not exist. Put plainly, 
such a system prohibits the solicitation of funds from private citizens and organizations. As such, 
the three worries listed above no longer apply. 
     I will now turn to the question of expenditure limits. Much attention has been given, both in 
the Rawlsian literature and elsewhere, to the question of whether these limits should be 
reinstated. In light of the Buckley decision, we must ask: 1) should expenditures from a 
candidate‟s own money be regulated, and 2) should total campaign expenditures be regulated? It 
was said before that justice as fairness requires that both types of limits be put in place, so as to 
ensure the fair value of the political liberties. Now, consider a scenario in which Buckley is 
overturned and the FECA‟s various expenditure limits are reinstated. This will prevent the worst 
cases of inequality in the worth of a candidate‟s speech, e.g. when a wealthy candidate is able to 
outspend a less-wealth rival. However, some inequality of the value of political liberty will still 
exist in such a system. Wealthier candidates will still possess an initial advantage, even if it is 
lessened to some degree. Moreover, these expenditure limits will not address the primary 
concern noted by Nelson, i.e. the increasing „demand‟ of money for politicians. Money will still 
be essentially entangled in the system of campaign finance, and, as I have already suggested, the 
effects of this entanglement are harmful in essence. Expenditure ceilings can only curb the rising 
costs of national campaigns and prevent gross imbalances; they cannot eliminate the wholesale 
reliance of politicians on the solicitation of funds. Now, certainly it cannot be denied that the 
reinstatement of expenditure limits would produce a more just system of campaign finance in the 
Rawlsian perspective. However, it seems clear that such measures will not produce the most just 
arrangement and will not fully realize the fair value of political liberty. In my view, a MEPF 
system will better accomplish these two ends. In such a system, expenditure ceilings are simply 
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unnecessary. When only a certain specific amount of money is allowed to each candidate, the 
candidates obviously cannot spend more than their allotted amounts. As such, the need for 
spending ceilings evaporates. In such a system, a candidate‟s personal wealth or social standing 
cannot influence the amount of money present in her campaign war chest; thus, these factors 
cannot influence campaign spending. As such, the value of the potential (not actual) influence of 
all candidates will be made roughly-equal, and the fair value provision will be satisfied. 
     In regard to reporting and disclosure requirements, a MEPF system will certainly be no more 
burdensome than the current regulatory regime, as centered around the FEC. Campaigns will no 
longer be required to compile and file regular reports that list all relevant information on all 
contributors who have given more than a certain amount. Individual and organizational 
contributors will no longer be required to report monetary donations over the allotted amount. 
The FEC will no longer be required to process, store, and publicize all such data. Instead, the 
agency will merely need to review claims for public funding from potential candidates and 
ensure the proper disbursement thereof. Campaigns will simply be required to regularly report 
expenditures, so as to ensure that public funds are not spent illicitly. It seems clear that the 
institution of MEPF will not drastically increase or decrease the current burdens on government, 
citizen, or candidate in regard to disclosure. Now, I acknowledge that this claim is largely 
speculative and that I lack the proper administrative expertise to fully justify such a conclusion. 
Nevertheless, even if MEPF did significantly increase the burdens placed on the relevant parties, 
this is not in itself an objection to MEPF in the Rawlsian view of justice. Certainly the concern 
for ensuring fair value will override any such prudential concerns as to additional paperwork. 
Moreover, I think it highly likely that a universal system of public financing will lead to a more 
public dissemination of information of candidates‟ finances. If this is correct, then citizens will 
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have access to more information under a MEPF system so as to make informed judgments on 
candidates. As I stated in Ch. IV, I take informed decision-making to be a crucial component of 
the political liberties of voting and participation.  
     Finally, it is necessary to consider the regulation of independent expenditures in such a 
system. These concerns do not bear directly on the validity of MEPF, as independent, non-
coordinated expenditures must be financed solely by private citizens and organizations. I take my 
discussion of Citizens United in Ch. IV to require a general prohibition on electioneering 
communications and independent expenditures by corporations and labor unions. The reasoning 
that led to that conclusion stands and is not affected directly by the adoption of MEPF. 
Regarding independent expenditures by non-economic entities and natural persons, it was said in 
Ch. IV that the guarantee of fair value requires the regulation of such spending. This does not 
imply, however, that such expenditures must be prohibited wholesale. Instead, a general ceiling 
on aggregate spending by persons during an election cycle, done in non-coordinated support of 
or opposition to a candidate, must be instituted. This will ensure roughly-equal chances for 
private citizens and organizations to influence the outcome of democratic procedures. Some may 
question the distinction made here: why is it the case that fair value requires a prohibition of 
corporate expenditures, but only regulation of non-corporate private expenditures? The 
difference lies with the potential for distorted influence that arises out of the corporate form, as 
the Austin Court first noted. Corporations are afforded additional privileges in the context of 
potential influence by virtue of the corporate form, while private citizens lack these benefits. The 
concern here is primarily one of fairness, as was stressed before.  
     In sum, the main problems of campaign finance in the current context may be addressed by 
contribution limits, expenditure limits, independent expenditure regulations, and disclosure and 
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reporting requirements. However, a MEPF system addresses all of these same concerns while at 
the same time better realizing justice as fairness and, specifically, the fair value of the political 
liberties. Such a system is arguably simpler than the installation of various distinct solutions to 
the problems raised, and thus more likely to be understood fully by private citizens. It may be 
said accordingly that a basic structure that includes MEPF will tend toward greater publicity, 
which in turn will contribute to a greater degree of stability internal to the structure. Moreover, 
MEPF may be able to address concerns of campaign finance that the other measures leave out, 
e.g. unregulated soft money donations and the monetary influence of PACs. Because MEPF 
prohibits non-public contributions to and spending by candidates, the concerns raised by 
donations of this type will no longer exist. In my view, the elegance of such a system in dealing 
effectively with so many disparate problems counts in its favor. 
      It may be objected that a MEPF system too greatly restricts the potential influence of citizens 
over the outcome of elections. In Rawlsian terms, this objection holds that MEPF results in a 
less-than-fully adequate scheme of political liberty, specifically in reference to the right of 
political participation. Under such a system, private citizens can no longer voice support of 
candidates by means of monetary contributions, thus lessening the liberty of participation 
available to them. The liberty of political speech allotted to candidates is also reduced via the de 
facto expenditure ceilings created under MEPF. There are several ways to respond to such a 
charge. Most importantly, the First Principle requires the existence of a universal scheme of 
fully-adequate liberty; however, it also requires that the fair value of all political liberties be 
guaranteed. It was argued earlier that fair value may not be fully realized in the absence of a 
MEPF system in the modern American context. Thus, so long as the scheme of political liberty 
produced is adequate, a full realization of fair value requires such a system, even at the cost of 
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some reductions in liberty. We now ask: is the scheme of liberty produced adequate? It is 
important to note that monetary speech is not the only means of potential political influence. 
Pure speech and expressive conduct, as well as association with politically-oriented groups, may 
be achieved in the absence of significant financial expenditure. Moreover, if MEPF were to be 
instituted, it seems likely that non-monetary speech would increase greatly in value. In other 
words, the degree of potential influence associated with monetary speech would fall, while the 
degree of potential influence associated with pure speech/expressive conduct would rise. The 
point here is this: in the current system, money is necessary for a great deal of political speech, as 
the Buckley Court first noted. However, in a society with MEPF in place, this claim would no 
longer be true. Thus, there is little reason to believe that a MEPF system will result in an 
unsatisfactory scheme of political liberty, and it is clear that such a system will best realize the 
guarantee of fair value. 
2. Shape of the Proposal 
     It is not my purpose here to give a full policy recommendation as to the adoption of a MEPF 
system. Instead, I will attempt to outline the broad contours of such a system, in the form of 
specific conditions that must be met. The particular details required by its installation are, of 
course, highly fact-sensitive. If this proposal were ever to be adopted in actuality, a careful 
review of all relevant political, social, cultural, and economic factors would need to be 
undertaken. Such a review is clearly beyond the scope of this project. 
      As such, I will define only the basic parameters of an adequate MEPF system. Any proposal 
that meets these conditions, whether voucher-based, based on a tax-supported general fund, etc., 
will best realize justice as fairness in this context. I propose that the reformed system of U.S. 
federal campaign finance must: 
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1. Prohibit direct contributions from natural persons to federal election campaigns; 
2. Prohibit direct contributions from all private organizations, corporations, unions, etc.; 
3. Prohibit coordinated expenditures by natural persons or private organizations; 
4. Provide funds to federal election campaigns using only publicly-distributed monies: 
a. Establish a threshold condition of proven popular support (e.g. through petition 
signatures or other means) for public funding; 
b. Establish tiers of funding levels into which candidates are placed based on the 
amount of proven public support shown; 
c. Automatically allow public funding for incumbent candidates; 
d. Automatically place incumbent candidate into the highest funding tier; 
e. Establish strict prohibitions on the purchasing of petition signatures or other 
means of support; 
f. Disallow discrimination in allotment of funds based on political ideology, 
religious views, or any other content-based identification; 
g. Prohibit all campaign spending beyond the level of public funding allotted; 
5. Require quarterly and post-election reports of all expenditures by candidates; 
6. Make such reports publicly-accessible within a reasonable period of time; 
7. Place the names of all publicly-funded candidates on the appropriate ballots; 
8. Prohibit corporate/union funding of all electioneering communications or express 
advocacy media; 
9. Set expenditure limits on non-coordinated independent expenditures by natural persons, 
noneconomic corporations, political committees, etc.; 




11. Allow candidates in lower levels of funding to apply for increased public funding rates, 
not to exceed the highest level, when in competition with higher- level-funded candidates, 
especially incumbents; 
12. Prohibit the use of public funds for purposes not substantially related to the campaign at 
hand or issues of public significance. 
These conditions broadly define the parameters of a MEPF system that will best realize justice as 
fairness in the current context. Further conditions may be required upon closer examination, or 
some of the above provisions may be stated too stringently. These modifications are perfectly 
acceptable within an inquiry as fact-sensitive as this. However, I believe that the general, non-
exhaustive list above gives the rough shape of a reformative program for campaign finance that 
will best ensure the fair value of political liberty.  
     In conclusion, I have argued that a MEPF program of some kind is required by Rawls‟ theory 
when applied to the modern American context. I have further attempted to provide some 
indication of what this system may look like. Ultimately, what is most clear is that Rawls‟ theory 
of distributive justice requires a far more robust regulatory regime than that which currently 
exists in the United States. Serious reformative measures will be required if justice as fairness is 
to be more fully realized in the basic structure of this nation. I have also suggested, in past 
chapters, that this program of reform conflicts greatly with the current interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution as offered by the Supreme Court. This tension between political philosophy and 
constitutional law will not be easy to reconcile. Indeed, the program for reform discussed above 
may lie outside the current realm of practical possibility. However, I believe that this discussion 
has defined a benchmark against which our current system of campaign finance may be 
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measured. The aim now must be to effect reform that will move the current regime closer to the 
Rawlsian ideal.  
3. Feasibility of the Proposal 
     I will now briefly consider several problems of political feasibility that may arise in 
implementing such a system. My aim here is not to resolve all such problems, i.e. to „pave the 
way‟ for realizing justice as fairness in U.S. campaign finance reform. Instead, I will merely 
attempt to identity the main obstacles to such a reformative effort. 
      First and foremost, it should be clear that a MEPF system would most likely be ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, given its current jurisprudence. The reasons for this 
should be apparent from my discussion of the Court‟s reasoning in Ch. IV. As such, it should 
come as no surprise that a MEPF system will not comply with the Court‟s current interpretation 
of the First Amendment. I do not consider this a substantial concern for my project. After all, one 
significant claim of this paper is that current constraints on campaign finance reform, as 
established by the Court, violate important aspects of justice as fairness. An optimally-just 
financing arrangement will not be possible without the overruling of large parts of Buckley and 
Citizens United. As I have suggested, there is no essential incompatibility between relevant parts 
of the U.S. Constitution and justice as fairness. The First Amendment as written, for example, 
may not go far enough in ensuring an adequate scheme of equal political liberty; however, the 
language contained therein is also fully represented in Rawls‟ work. In other words, it is not 
necessary to completely abandon the current U.S. Constitution to make significant progress in 
more justly financing election campaigns. In my view, the greatest tension lies between the 
Court‟s current interpretation of the First Amendment and the demands of the First Principle. If 
this tension is resolved, we may be confident in the constitutionality of a MEPF approach to 
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campaign finance reform.  
     A separate concern is this: how would we administer and regulate such a system? After all, a 
set of conditions for a program of reform, as given in the last section, is worthless without some 
guarantee that those conditions will be upheld. In my view, no drastic change in agency is 
necessary to achieve this end. The FEC is already designed so as to receive financial reports, 
publicize rules and regulations, and enforce potential violations of election law. The FEC could 
continue to play this role under a MEPF system. The agency would collect regular financial 
expenditure reports from campaigns and make this information promptly available for public 
scrutiny. In addition, the FEC would oversee the disbursement of public funds to candidates, as 
well as bringing legal action against alleged violators of election law. Such expanded 
responsibilities would most likely necessitate additional funding for the agency and a larger staff. 
Now, one potential concern with this arrangement may arise out of the partisanship of the FEC. 
As I mentioned earlier, following Buckley, FEC members are appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. In a situation where one party holds both the presidency and a Senate 
majority, worries over the undue control of the FEC by that party will be apparent. If we accept 
the Court‟s ruling in Buckley as to the delegation of executive power, such an arrangement may 
be unavoidable under the current Constitution. At present, it is difficult to see how we might 
alleviate these concerns. The ultimate aim, of course, is to reasonably guarantee the impartiality 
of FEC board members. This might be achieved by granting these members lifetime tenure, as 
conditioned on good behavior, much in the same way that federal judges are appointed. 
Alternatively, we may require that a certain number of members be non-politician citizens, such 
as academics or other knowledgeable persons. Whatever the best solution may be, it would be 
outside the scope of my project to further pursue this line of inquiry. 
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     A final concern is more specific to Rawls‟ philosophy and arises out of the publicity 
constraint: that is, will such a MEPF system be accepted and understood by the citizens of the 
United States?  In other words, will my proposal exhibit a sufficient degree of „uptake‟ so as to 
encourage adoption by the citizenry? The answers to these questions are, of course, largely 
empirical; they rely on knowledge of the psychological states and tendencies of many persons. 
Nevertheless, I will venture a few speculative claims on this point. It may be true that, if the 
installation of a MEPF system were put forth today as a constitutional amendment, it would not 
gain sufficient public support. Many people would be, I think, wary over such a drastic reform of 
current law. Some may be skeptical as to the validity of a system that effectively removes their 
ability to privately contribute to their favored candidates. Fortunately, realization of my proposal 
is not dependent on an all-inclusive, one-time amendment to the Constitution. The system could 
perhaps be realized in stages, thus allowing individuals to become acquainted with the new 
system and accepting of its restrictions. Over time, this may generate enough uptake so as to 
remove any Rawlsian concerns arising out of stability or publicity. 
     In fact, such a gradual program of reform may be ultimately superior in realizing justice as 
fairness, due to an important interpretive point on fair value.29 In my view, the best way to 
interpret the notion of fair value is not as a stark, wholesale requirement of a basic structure, but 
rather as a safeguard against clear, identifiable inequalities of value. If we think of this in the 
context of the original position, we do not expect the parties to design their society‟s basic 
structure around the notion of fair value. Instead, we expect them to design a system that 
guarantees a fully-adequate scheme of equal liberty for all citizens. Once the proposal for this 
system is put forth, the contractors discuss the implications thereof and attempt to predict any 
undesirable consequences of the system. Perhaps, as Daniels does, they will recognize the 
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potential for substantial inequalities in the worth of the equal political liberties. Of course, the 
value of these liberties cannot be fully equalized, as the contractors cannot account for speaking 
skill, attractiveness, etc. Instead, they look only for substantial probable inequalities in value, 
and then they adjust the scheme of liberty so as to compensate. We may think that, in attempting 
to realize fair value in campaign finance, our program for reform should follow this same model. 
We will begin by searching out the most significant and apparent inequalities in value and will 
then make necessary reforms to the system. We continue to identify and remove these 
inequalities, moving from the most apparent to the more nuanced, until the system roughly 
guarantees the fair value of the political liberties. As should be apparent, this process will be both 
gradual and systematic. We should expect that such a process will tend toward greater public 
acceptance than a sudden, drastic constitutional change.  
     In this section, I have considered only a few of many concerns over the feasibility of my 
proposal for reform. Discussion of other worries is not possible at this time. Nevertheless, I hope 
to have indicated at least the theoretical feasibility of such a project. Other more tangible, 
context-sensitive obstacles will have to be considered as they arise.  
 
Chapter VI: Conclusion 
     When dealing with an issue as large and difficult as that of campaign finance reform, certain 
complications must, by necessity, be set to the side. This is certainly true of this project. I have 
not, for example, attempted any empirical study of the actual effects of certain Supreme Court 
decisions, nor have I attempted to survey the current flow of money from particular parties to 
campaign coffers. Such work is important for any full understanding of the problem of campaign 
finance, but that has not been my project in this paper. Instead, I have attempted to identify the 
strains of thought and reasoning that underlie our current system of campaign finance, as well as 
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the constraints imposed on that system by actors like the Congress and the Court. I then analyzed 
those lines of reasoning in the light of Rawls‟ theory of distributive justice. 
     What conclusions may we draw from this project? First and foremost, it is without question 
that the current system fails to even roughly approximate justice as fairness. More broadly, we 
may say that the current system is incompatible with Rawls‟ general methodology for thinking 
about problems of justice. Regardless of which particular conception of justice is selected to 
guide our society‟s basic structure, the current system of campaign finance is not aimed at 
ensuring the instantiation of the values of stability, publicity, the exercise of the two moral 
powers, etc. Accordingly, the system cannot be publicly accepted and understood by rational 
persons in their capacity as citizens. This in itself is a concern of great importance, especially 
given the close proximity of issues of campaign finance to the realization of the political 
liberties. The situation appears even graver if justice as fairness is adopted as the public criterion 
of justice for this society. In that case, it is undeniable that the current system fails to guarantee 
the fair value of the political liberties, e.g. the right to vote, the liberty of political speech, the 
right to political participation.  
     I have also identified the Supreme Court as the primary agent responsible for inhibiting the 
progress of the system in the direction of justice as fairness. The reformative efforts of the 
Congress, such as the FECA, its Amendments, and the BCRA, all made important strides toward 
improving the current system. Moreover, as I described in Ch. IV, these actions tended toward 
better realizing justice as fairness in the context of justice as fairness. However, many of the 
most significant aspects of these measures have been now found unconstitutional by the Court. 
These include campaign expenditure limits, candidate contribution limits, and the prohibition on 
corporate/labor union funding of independent expenditures. I have also said that the main reason 
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for this trend is not a fundamental incompatibility between justice as fairness and the U.S. 
Constitution, as written, but rather discordance between the Court‟s unduly-narrow interpretation 
of the First Amendment and Rawls‟ approach to justice. This tension must be reconciled if any 
truly significant efforts are to be made to reform the current system.  
     I have also described, in broad strokes, the program for reform that would best realize justice 
as fairness in the modern American context. Such a program would culminate in a mandatory 
exclusive public financing (MEPF) system, which is actually a category of different possible 
approaches to the issue of campaign finance reform. There are most likely multiple ways in 
which to instantiate such a system, e.g. a voucher-based program, expansion of the current public 
financing system, etc. The particular contours of the program will be, of course, highly fact-
sensitive. Nevertheless, I have argued that any system that roughly fulfills the MEPF conditions 
set forth in Ch. V will approximately realize justice as fairness. The actual path to reform is sure 
to be beset by many obstacles, not the least of which will be the Supreme Court. However, I have 
also given some reason to believe that even a true MEPF system does not lie outside the realm of 
feasibility. Its full realization may not be practically possible at this moment, but gradual 
progress in that direction may accomplish the same end.  
     In sum, I have attempted a Rawlsian critique of the reasoning behind the current U.S. system 
of campaign finance at the federal level. This is certainly not the only mode of critique one might 
employ. The views of other political and moral philosophers could also be applied to the problem 
in the same manner, with varying degrees of probable success. However, I have suggested that 
Rawls‟ theory of distributive justice offers an especially-promising method for critically 
analyzing the current system. While Rawls does offer formal principles that I have applied to the 
case at hand, his theory also lends itself to a higher- level mode of critique. Rawls provides a 
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general methodology for thinking about problems of justice, and it is through this framework that 
I have attempted to examine the problem of campaign finance. Accordingly, the conclusions of 
this paper are not essentially dependent on adoption of Rawls‟ favored conception of justice. 
Instead, use of Rawls‟ methodology has allowed for the identification of the substantial 
inadequacies of our current system. This framework for thinking about justice has also suggested 
means by which to eliminate those deficiencies. It is now left to the nation‟s citizens and their 
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